People v. Blakeney, 88 N.Y.2d 1012 (1996)
A defendant’s testimony denying a relationship with a co-defendant opens the door to the admissibility of evidence of a subsequent arrest with the same co-defendant to disprove the claimed lack of relationship, even if it involves evidence of another crime.
Summary
Lorenzo Blakeney was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, Blakeney claimed he had never met his co-defendant, Shakira Fleming, before his initial arrest. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a subsequent arrest of Blakeney with Fleming for a similar offense. The New York Court of Appeals held that Blakeney’s testimony opened the door to this evidence to contradict his claim, even if it incidentally showed another crime. The Court also found his claims of prosecutorial bias and burden shifting were unpreserved and his other claims were without merit.
Facts
On November 4, 1992, Lorenzo Blakeney was arrested with Shakira Fleming for allegedly selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer.
Twelve days later, on November 16, 1992, Blakeney was again arrested with Fleming for allegedly committing the same offense at the same location.
At trial, Blakeney testified that he had never seen or known Fleming before the initial arrest.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court found Blakeney guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant’s claim that he had never seen or known Fleming before his first arrest opened the door to evidence of a subsequent arrest with Fleming to disprove his claim.
Holding
Yes, because the defendant’s testimony denying any prior relationship with Fleming made the evidence of the subsequent arrest with her relevant to contradict his account of their relationship.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Blakeney’s claim of never having met Fleming before his first arrest opened the door to the admission of evidence tending to disprove his account. The subsequent arrest with Fleming was deemed relevant for “contradiction and response” regarding the existence of their relationship, rather than simply to impeach his general credibility. The court cited People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289, 295, noting that the evidence was admissible to contradict the specific testimony offered by the defendant. The court distinguished between using prior bad acts to impeach general credibility versus using them to directly contradict a specific assertion made by the defendant. The court emphasized the defendant created the issue by asserting he didn’t know Fleming. By denying the relationship, he opened the door to the prosecution’s evidence showing they were arrested together soon after, suggesting a connection that contradicted his testimony.
The Court also found that Blakeney’s claims of prosecutorial bias and the shifting of the burden of proof were unpreserved for review because no objections were made during the trial. Further, the court summarily dismissed Blakeney’s remaining claims as without merit. The decision underscores the principle that a defendant’s specific assertions during testimony can create an opportunity for the prosecution to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to directly contradict those assertions.