88 N.Y.2d 998 (1996)
While the preferred phrasing for a reasonable doubt instruction is outlined in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, deviations from this phrasing are permissible if, in the context of the entire jury charge, the instruction does not dilute the standard of proof or deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Summary
Ronald Cubino was convicted of criminal trespass and burglary. On appeal, he argued that the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt was improper because it referenced decisions jurors make in their personal lives, thus diluting the standard of proof. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while the trial court’s phrasing was not ideal, it did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial when considering the charge as a whole. The Court emphasized that the preferred phrasing is found in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, but deviations are not automatically grounds for reversal.
Facts
Ronald Cubino was found guilty by a jury on one count of criminal trespass in the second degree and one count of burglary in the second degree. The specific facts of the underlying crime are not detailed in this decision, as the appeal centered solely on the propriety of the jury instructions.
Procedural History
Following a jury trial conviction, Cubino appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt was flawed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Cubino then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, by leave of the Presiding Justice at the Appellate Division.
Issue(s)
Whether a trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt, which deviates from the preferred phrasing in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions by referencing decisions jurors might make in their personal lives, constitutes reversible error if the overall charge is balanced and correct and does not dilute the required standard of proof.
Holding
No, because in the context of the entire balanced and correct set of instructions given, the objected-to portion of the instruction did not dilute the standard of required proof nor did it deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the trial court’s instruction was “less definitive and potentially more troublesome” than the preferred language in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, which states: “The doubt, to be a reasonable doubt, should be one which a reasonable person acting in a matter of this importance would be likely to entertain because of the evidence or because of the lack or insufficiency of the evidence in the case.” However, the Court emphasized that the critical inquiry is whether the instruction, viewed in its entirety, accurately conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. The Court highlighted Justice Mazzarelli’s concurring opinion at the Appellate Division, which emphasized that the contested portion of the instruction did not diminish the standard of proof or prejudice the defendant, especially considering the other, correct instructions given. The Court concluded that deviations from the preferred phrasing should be avoided, but are not per se reversible error if the essential meaning is conveyed. The court found no dilution of the standard in the complete context of the charge. This case illustrates that challenges to jury instructions are highly fact-specific, turning on the precise language used and the overall context of the charge.