People v. Daddona, 81 N.Y.2d 990 (1993)
A circumstantial evidence instruction is only required when the prosecution’s case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence; direct evidence of a defendant’s participation in a crime, even as an accessory, negates the need for such an instruction.
Summary
Daddona was convicted of robbery. Eyewitness testimony placed him at the scene, acting as a lookout while his accomplice committed the robbery. He requested a circumstantial evidence instruction, which the trial court denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because there was direct evidence (eyewitness testimony) of Daddona’s role in the crime, the circumstantial evidence instruction was not required. The court emphasized that the eyewitness testimony directly proved Daddona’s participation, at a minimum, as a lookout.
Facts
Prior to the robbery, Daddona and an accomplice were seen conversing. During the robbery, Daddona stood by, acting as a lookout. The accomplice robbed two victims at knifepoint. Daddona and the accomplice fled together and were apprehended nearby.
Procedural History
Daddona was convicted of two counts of first-degree robbery at trial. He appealed, arguing the People’s case was based solely on circumstantial evidence and the trial court erred in denying his request for a circumstantial evidence instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence instruction when eyewitness testimony directly established the defendant’s role as a lookout during the commission of the robbery.
Holding
No, because eyewitness testimony directly proved that the defendant acted as a lookout while the crime was being committed, which constitutes direct evidence of accessorial guilt, rendering a circumstantial evidence instruction unnecessary.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that a circumstantial evidence instruction is only necessary when the proof of guilt rests exclusively on circumstantial evidence, citing People v. Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d 375, 380. In this case, eyewitness testimony established that Daddona engaged in acts that directly proved he acted as a lookout during the robbery. The court emphasized, “Eyewitness testimony, if believed by the jury, established that defendant engaged in acts which directly proved that at the very least he acted as a lookout while the crime was being committed.” This direct evidence of Daddona’s participation as a lookout, coupled with his conduct before and after the crime, meant the prosecution’s case was not based solely on circumstantial evidence. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the request for a circumstantial evidence instruction. The court distinguished direct from circumstantial evidence: Direct evidence proves a fact directly, while circumstantial evidence requires inferences to connect it to the fact at issue. Here, the eyewitness testimony directly established Daddona’s role as a lookout, eliminating the need for inferences and thus, the need for a circumstantial evidence charge. The court reinforced this by stating Daddona’s accessorial guilt could not be viewed as premised solely on circumstantial evidence.