88 N.Y.2d 257 (1996)

CPL 250.10 requires a defendant to provide pretrial notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence, even if the expert did not examine the defendant, and a defendant is only relieved of the duty to retreat from a dwelling if it is their own dwelling.

Summary

Defendant Berk was convicted of manslaughter and murder after fatally shooting his wife and her lover. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in excluding expert psychiatric testimony due to lack of notice under CPL 250.10 and in its jury charge regarding justification, specifically whether the house was his “dwelling.” The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that CPL 250.10 applies to all psychiatric evidence, regardless of whether it stems from an examination of the defendant, and that the jury was correct to determine if the residence was defendant’s dwelling. The court emphasized the importance of timely notice to prevent prejudice to the prosecution and ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process.

Facts

Defendant and his wife, Virginia Berk, experienced marital problems. Defendant installed an eavesdropping device on their home telephone and overheard a conversation suggesting his wife was having an affair with Police Officer Joseph Valvo. One night, defendant found his wife and Valvo in bed together and shot Valvo. His wife escaped to the kitchen and called the police, but defendant shot and killed her. Defendant surrendered to the police. At trial, defendant claimed justification for shooting Valvo, alleging Valvo threatened him and the gun fired accidentally during a struggle. He also claimed extreme emotional disturbance regarding his wife’s death, stating he had no memory of shooting her.

Procedural History

Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree murder. At trial, he raised the defenses of justification and extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court denied the admission of expert psychiatric testimony from Dr. Ewing, due to lack of notice to the prosecution. Defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter of Joseph Valvo and second-degree murder of Virginia Berk. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether CPL 250.10 requires a defendant to provide pretrial notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence when the expert did not examine the defendant.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow late notice and introduction of the mental health evidence.
3. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that the Sable Park Court residence was the defendant’s dwelling as a matter of law, for the purposes of the justification defense and the duty to retreat.

Holding

1. Yes, because the plain language of the statute requires that any evidence regarding a mental disease or defect offered in relation to the defense of extreme emotional disturbance or any other defense be preceded by timely notice to the People.
2. No, because the decision to allow late notice is discretionary, and the court weighed the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense against the prejudice to the People from the belated notice.
3. No, because whether the Sable Park Court residence was the defendant’s dwelling was a disputed factual question for the jury to decide, based on the conflicting evidence presented at trial.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 250.10 aims to prevent disadvantage to the prosecution by surprise, allowing them sufficient opportunity to obtain psychiatric and other evidence to refute the defense of mental infirmity. The court stated that, “the primary aim of the pretrial notice requirement was to ensure the prosecution sufficient opportunity ‘to obtain the psychiatric and other evidence necessary to refute’ the proffered defense of mental infirmity.” The court emphasized the broad scope of CPL 250.10, encompassing evidence related to any defense, not just those based on a formal psychiatric examination of the defendant. Refusal to allow late notice was within the trial court’s discretion, balancing the defendant’s right to present a defense with the prejudice to the prosecution from the delayed notice. The court considered the defendant’s failure to offer a good cause for the delay. Regarding the “dwelling” instruction, the court noted that while a dwelling is defined as “a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night,” the critical question was whether Sable Park Court was his dwelling. Because evidence was presented to both support and oppose the conclusion that it was, it was not error to deny the defendant’s request to instruct the jury that he had no duty to retreat, since the residence was his dwelling. The court concluded that the trial court appropriately left this factual question to the jury to decide.