People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996)

A defendant, represented by counsel, has the ultimate authority to make fundamental decisions regarding the case, including whether to request submission of an affirmative defense to the jury, even over the objections of counsel.

Summary

The defendant was convicted of murdering his parents. At trial, he asserted an insanity defense. The trial court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which would reduce the charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed, but later changed his mind, against his counsel’s advice, fearing it would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court, after a colloquy with the defendant, honored the defendant’s wishes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the decision to submit the affirmative defense rested with the defendant, not counsel, as it was a fundamental decision about the case’s presentation.

Facts

The defendant was charged with murdering his parents. His defense was that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the criminal consequences of his actions due to a mental disease or defect.
After both sides rested, the court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the murder charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed to the instruction. The next day, the defendant changed his mind and informed the court that he only wanted three possible verdicts submitted to the jury: guilty of murder, not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or not guilty. The defendant believed that submitting the extreme emotional disturbance defense would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of murder after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by allowing him to override his counsel’s advice regarding the extreme emotional disturbance defense without conducting a “searching inquiry.” The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant, represented by counsel, has the right to decide whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury, even when counsel advises against it.

Holding

Yes, because the decision of whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance rests with the defendant, as it concerns a fundamental decision regarding the case that impacts the potential verdict and the defendant’s fate.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant retains the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding their case, even when represented by counsel. These decisions include whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify on their own behalf, or take an appeal. The court analogized the decision of whether to submit the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to these fundamental decisions, emphasizing its potential impact on the verdict.
The court noted that the defendant’s decision was not simply a matter of trial strategy or tactics. Rather, the defendant perceived that charging the jury on both murder and manslaughter provided two opportunities for the jury to convict, and he calculated that eliminating consideration of manslaughter increased his chance for an acquittal. The court found that the trial court was under no obligation to conduct a “searching inquiry” because the defendant was not forfeiting his Sixth Amendment right. The trial court’s inquiry was sufficient to establish that the defendant understood the nature of his request to limit the charges submitted to the jury. The court stated, “Manifestly, a verdict is dispositive of a defendant’s fate and, as this defendant recognized, the submission of the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the jury could indeed be determinative of the verdict.”
The court cited Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, noting that a defendant retains ultimate authority over certain fundamental decisions. The court concluded that the defendant could not later complain that his miscalculation translated into a forced relinquishment of his right to counsel, especially since counsel repeatedly voiced disagreement and continued to actively represent the defendant throughout the trial. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722, 730-731, highlighting that no “searching inquiry” was required under these circumstances. Ultimately, because the defendant understood the ramifications of his request, the trial court properly acceded to it.