People v. Revaine Pratt, 95 N.Y.2d 426 (2000)
When a defendant is charged with inconsistent counts, a trial court may instruct the jury to consider the charges in alternating order during deliberations, considering first the greater, then the lesser offenses to ensure the jury verdict reflects the defendant’s true culpability.
Summary
Defendant was convicted of depraved mind murder after fatally shooting Revaine Pratt. The indictment included charges for both intentional murder and depraved mind murder, with lesser included manslaughter charges for each. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the charges in a specific alternating order. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury to consider the charges in this alternating order, and the procedure avoids possible miscarriage of justice, allowing the jury to render a verdict that reflects defendant’s culpability. The Court also rejected a vagueness challenge to the depraved indifference murder statute.
Facts
During an altercation in a parking lot, the defendant shot Revaine Pratt with a shotgun, resulting in Pratt’s death. The defendant was indicted on two counts: intentional murder and reckless murder under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life. For each murder count, a lesser included offense of manslaughter was also submitted to the jury.
Procedural History
The defendant was tried, and the court instructed the jury to consider the charges in a specific order: intentional murder, then depraved mind murder, then manslaughter in the first degree, and finally manslaughter in the second degree. The jury found the defendant not guilty of intentional murder but guilty of depraved mind murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider inconsistent counts in an alternating order, “jumping back and forth” between them.
2. Whether Penal Law § 125.25(2), the depraved indifference murder statute, is unconstitutionally vague.
3. Whether the court erred in failing to submit manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser included offense under the intentional murder count.
Holding
1. No, because Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure Law does not dictate the order in which a jury considers offenses and the alternating order avoids a potential miscarriage of justice.
2. No, because conduct evincing a depraved indifference to human life is well understood under New York law.
3. The court declined to rule because the jury found the defendant guilty of reckless murder and did not reach the lesser offense of manslaughter in the first degree.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s instruction to the jury to consider the inconsistent counts in an alternating order was permissible. The Court reasoned that nothing in Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure Law directs the order in which the jury should consider various offenses. “Sanctioning the procedure used by the court in this case also avoids a possible miscarriage of justice. If the jury must consider and render a verdict on every offense submitted under the first count before considering any other count, it could find defendant guilty of manslaughter as a lesser included offense under the first count submitted, before reaching the inconsistent offense of depraved mind murder under the second count. It could be forced to convict defendant of a lesser crime than his conduct actually warranted.” The Court also found that the depraved indifference murder statute was not unconstitutionally vague, citing precedent that conduct with depraved indifference to human life is well understood. The court emphasized that allowing the jury to consider the greater and then lesser offenses allows for a “realistic accommodation” between rules requiring submission of lesser included offenses and the principle that the jury should render a verdict that reflects the defendant’s culpability. The Court declined to address whether the failure to submit manslaughter in the second degree was error because the jury did not reach that charge.