McManus v. Board of Education, 87 N.Y.2d 183 (1995)
A school board cannot artificially extend a principal’s probationary period by designating the initial period of service as “acting” or “temporary” and, thus, the principal may acquire tenure by estoppel if the board allows them to serve beyond the statutory three-year probationary period.
Summary
Joan McManus, a career educator, was appointed “Acting” Middle School Principal in July 1989. After a year, she was appointed to the position on a probationary basis for two years. The Board later stated this probationary period should be three years total. After serving three years in total, the Board terminated her employment. McManus argued she had acquired tenure by estoppel. The Court of Appeals held that the board could not artificially extend her probationary period by initially designating her as “acting” principal and that she had acquired tenure by estoppel by serving beyond the statutory three-year period.
Facts
Joan McManus, a certified school administrator, had been employed by the Hempstead Union Free School District for 26 years.
In July 1989, the position of Middle School Principal became vacant, and in August 1989, the Board appointed McManus as “Acting” Middle School Principal.
On August 17, 1990, the Board appointed her to the position with a two-year probationary period.
In May 1991, the District sought advice from the NYS Department of Education regarding McManus’s tenure date and was informed that her probationary period began in August 1990 and that she was required to serve a three-year probationary period.
In May 1993, the Superintendent informed McManus that he was not recommending her for tenure, and the Board voted to terminate her.
Procedural History
McManus initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the Board’s resolution terminating her employment and to be restored to her position.
Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The Appellate Division affirmed.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Whether a school board can artificially extend a principal’s probationary period by designating the initial period of service as “acting” or “temporary,” thus preventing the acquisition of tenure by estoppel.
Holding
Yes, because a school board cannot undermine the policies behind the tenure system and artificially extend the probationary period by designating a position “acting” or “temporary”.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that a school district may not artificially increase the length of the probationary period established by state law, either directly or indirectly, by unduly delaying the formal appointment of a teacher (or administrator) to a particular position which that teacher in fact fills. The court stated, “Much like the petitioner in Ricca, Joan McManus was eventually appointed on a probationary basis to a position which she had been filling for almost a year. Inasmuch as probationary periods are employed to determine if appointees are ‘competent, efficient and satisfactory’ for purposes of recommending tenure, there is no reason why petitioner’s service following her initial appointment should be considered anything less than time accrued towards reducing the official three-year probationary period the statute requires.” The court emphasized that tenure evaluations can be made after three years regardless of the title under which the probationer serves, and a Board may not undermine the policies behind the tenure system and artificially extend the probationary period by designating a position “acting” or “temporary”. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Roberts v Community School Bd., stating that Roberts involved “Jarema” credit, which is not applicable to administrative personnel, whereas McManus filled a position left vacant and was not acting as a “substitute.” The court stated, “Petitioner cannot be estopped from asserting a state of facts that were known to all parties throughout the transaction. She is asserting a legal conclusion arising out of these facts, not seeking relief on the basis of something concealed from the Board, and a school board cannot be misled as to the legal significance of facts within its own knowledge.”