87 N.Y.2d 95 (1995)
New York’s toxic tort discovery rule (CPLR 214-c) applies to actions where the exposure to a harmful substance occurred before July 1, 1986, but the injury was not discovered until after that date, unless the injury was discoverable before July 1, 1986, and the statute of limitations had already expired.
Summary
Ari Rothstein ingested Thorotrast, a radioactive contrast dye, in the late 1940s. He was diagnosed with liver cancer in 1988 and died shortly after. His widow sued the dye manufacturers in 1990, alleging his cancer was caused by the dye. The trial court dismissed the claim as time-barred, arguing that CPLR 214-c only applied if both exposure and discovery occurred after 1986. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that CPLR 214-c applies even when exposure predates 1986, as long as the injury wasn’t discovered (or reasonably discoverable) until after that date and the statute of limitations had not already expired prior to that date.
Facts
- In 1948 or 1949, Ari Rothstein ingested Thorotrast, a radioactive contrast dye, during an X-ray procedure.
- Approximately 40 years later, on December 6, 1988, Rothstein underwent exploratory surgery due to severe abdominal pain.
- The surgery revealed a malignancy of his liver, and Rothstein died the same day from complications related to the cancer and surgery.
- In September 1990, Rothstein’s widow sued the manufacturers of Thorotrast, alleging negligence, strict products liability, wrongful death, and breach of warranty.
- The suit claimed Rothstein’s cancer was caused by the ingestion of the radioactive dye decades earlier.
Procedural History
- The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding it was time-barred under CPLR 3211(a)(5). The court interpreted CPLR 214-c as applying only when both the exposure and discovery occurred after the statute’s effective date in 1986.
- The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s dismissal regarding all causes of action except for breach of warranty.
- The Appellate Division granted the defendants leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the question of whether its order was properly made.
Issue(s)
Whether CPLR 214-c, New York’s toxic tort discovery statute, applies to cases where the exposure to a harmful substance occurred before July 1, 1986, but the injury was not discovered until after that date.
Holding
Yes, because CPLR 214-c(6) states the section applies to acts or omissions occurring before, on, or after July 1, 1986, unless the injury was discovered or should have been discovered before that date, and the action was or would have been time-barred before that date.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPLR 214-c(6) states that the law applies to acts occurring prior to July 1, 1986, unless (1) the exposure occurred before July 1, 1986, (2) the injury was discovered or should have been discovered before July 1, 1986, and (3) the statute of limitations had expired before that date. The court rejected the argument that applying the law in this manner would render a related revival statute meaningless. The court stated that the revival statute only applied to specific substances (DES, asbestos, etc.) where actions were dismissed before the effective date due to the statute of limitations. CPLR 214-c, on the other hand, establishes an accrual mechanism for injuries discovered after the effective date, regardless of when the exposure occurred, provided the limitations period had not already expired. The court noted that CPLR 214-c was enacted to remedy the injustice of barring claims before victims were even aware of their injuries. The court stated, “The discovery rule was enacted to ‘remed[y] a fundamental injustice in the laws of our State which has deprived persons suffering from exposure to toxic or harmful substances from having an opportunity to present their case in court‘” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1986, ch 682, 1986 NY Legis Ann, at 288). Because Rothstein’s injury was allegedly not discovered until 1988, the cause of action was not time-barred until 1991, making the 1990 action timely. The court explicitly stated they were making no implications concerning causation at this procedural stage.