People v. Trappier, 87 N.Y.2d 55 (1995)

A defendant can simultaneously intend to cause one result (e.g., serious physical injury) while recklessly creating a grave risk that a different, more serious result (e.g., death) will occur; thus, convictions for attempted assault and reckless endangerment are not inherently repugnant.

Summary

Trappier was convicted of attempted first-degree assault and first-degree reckless endangerment for firing shots at a security guard. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the jury verdict was repugnant because it seemingly convicted Trappier of acting both intentionally and recklessly. The Court held that the convictions were not repugnant because the attempted assault charge required intent to cause serious physical injury, while the reckless endangerment charge required recklessly creating a grave risk of death. Because these charges pertained to two distinct potential outcomes, the jury could reasonably find Trappier guilty of both.

Facts

Following a dispute, Trappier vowed to return to an apartment complex after being asked to leave by security guard Vernon Hutchinson. Later that evening, Trappier returned and fired three shots in Hutchinson’s direction from approximately 70 feet away. One bullet hit Hutchinson’s pants leg, and another passed near his ears.

Procedural History

Trappier was charged with attempted second-degree murder, attempted first-degree assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and first-degree reckless endangerment. The jury acquitted Trappier of attempted murder but convicted him of the remaining counts. The trial court rejected Trappier’s argument that the verdict was repugnant. The Appellate Division reversed the attempted assault and reckless endangerment convictions, finding them legally inconsistent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the convictions.

Issue(s)

Whether a jury verdict finding a defendant guilty of both attempted first-degree assault (requiring intent to cause serious physical injury) and first-degree reckless endangerment (requiring recklessly creating a grave risk of death) is repugnant when the charges arise from the same act.

Holding

No, because the attempted assault charge pertains to the intent to cause serious physical injury, while the reckless endangerment charge pertains to recklessly creating a grave risk of death; these are distinct potential outcomes, and a defendant can simultaneously intend one outcome while recklessly disregarding the risk of another.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Gallagher, where it held that a defendant could not be convicted of both intentional murder and reckless manslaughter for the death of a single victim. In Gallagher, the act and the result were the same: the shooting and the death. The Court explained that “where the shooting (the act) and the death (the result) are the same, a defendant cannot be convicted twice for the murder, once for acting ‘intentionally’ and once for acting ‘recklessly’.” Here, the Court reasoned that while the act (the shooting) was the same, the potential results differed. Attempted assault required the intent to cause serious physical injury, which includes “a physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement or protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” Reckless endangerment required recklessly creating a grave risk of death. The Court stated, “A defendant could certainly intend one result—serious physical injury—while recklessly creating a grave risk that a different, more serious result—death—would ensue from his actions.” The court emphasized that the jury had determined Trappier acted intentionally concerning one result and recklessly concerning a distinct, more serious result; thus, the verdict was not inconsistent. The court further clarified its holding in People v. Robinson, explaining that in that case, unlike the instant case, the defendant was convicted of acting intentionally and recklessly as to the same result—the death of the victim.