People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 599 (1995)
A defendant may expressly waive the right to raise a double jeopardy claim as part of a plea bargain, as there is no overriding societal interest that prevents such a waiver.
Summary
Defendant Allen was granted a mistrial over his objection after the prosecution’s key witness suffered a heart attack. Allen later pleaded guilty to lesser charges, expressly waiving his right to appeal on double jeopardy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that Allen’s waiver was valid. The Court reasoned that unlike rights such as the right to a speedy trial or competency to stand trial, there is no larger societal interest that prohibits a defendant from waiving double jeopardy protections in exchange for the benefits of a plea bargain. Therefore, the defendant was bound by his express waiver.
Facts
After jury selection in Allen’s trial for attempted murder and related charges, the prosecutor requested a continuance due to his key witness’s heart attack. The court granted a one-day continuance. The following day, the court learned the witness would be unavailable for at least seven weeks due to the severity of the heart attack. The prosecutor’s request for a second continuance was denied, and the court granted the People’s motion for a mistrial over the defendant’s objection, finding manifest necessity due to the witness’s critical testimony.
Procedural History
Allen pleaded guilty to lesser charges, waiving his right to appeal, including any double jeopardy claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the waiver invalid but upholding the mistrial based on manifest necessity. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant may validly waive the right to raise a double jeopardy defense as part of a plea bargain under New York State double jeopardy law.
Holding
Yes, because the court found no substantive basis to distinguish between an implied consent to retrial and the express waiver of a double jeopardy defense and that there is no overriding societal interest that prohibits a defendant from waiving double jeopardy protections in exchange for the benefits of a plea bargain.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that plea bargaining is a vital part of the criminal justice system, enabling parties to avoid the uncertainties of trial and to tailor sentences to the case’s circumstances. While certain appellate claims, such as the right to a speedy trial, legality of a sentence, and competency to stand trial, cannot be waived due to a larger societal interest in their correct resolution, a double jeopardy claim does not implicate the same concerns.
The Court emphasized that the purpose of the double jeopardy bar is to protect the defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a particular tribunal. However, a defendant may forgo this right in exchange for a definite sentence and protection against conviction on the highest counts. Expressly waiving a double jeopardy defense in a plea bargain does not implicate a larger societal value.
The court distinguished this case from those where certain appellate claims may not be waived because of a larger societal interest in their correct resolution, stating, “Society has a recognized interest in speedy trials because trial delay may result in the loss of evidence or an accused’s inability to respond to criminal charges, thereby compelling innocent persons to plead guilty out of necessity… Because of this societal interest, a defendant may not waive such claims… Similarly, a defendant may not waive the right to challenge the legality of a sentence…or his competency to stand trial… These rights are recognized as a matter of fairness to the accused but they also embrace the reality of fairness in the process itself.”
The court noted its holding aligns with the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which suggests an express waiver of double jeopardy protection is permissible. Referencing Menna v. New York, the court cited the Supreme Court’s caveat that “[w]e do not hold that a double jeopardy claim may never be waived. We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”
Therefore, the Court held the defendant was bound by his express waiver of his double jeopardy claim and did not reach the merits of the underlying double jeopardy claim itself.