86 N.Y.2d 565 (1995)
A destroyed document can never be deemed the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed Rosario material because its unavailability prevents a detailed comparison to assess discrepancies that could be useful for cross-examination.
Summary
Lesly Joseph was convicted of drug sale and possession. The prosecution failed to disclose envelopes used by an officer to hold drugs seized from Joseph and another individual, Gerzbach, arguing the information was duplicated in disclosed reports. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that destroyed evidence cannot be considered the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed material under Rosario. The court emphasized that the inability to inspect the original document prevents a determination of exact equivalence, potentially prejudicing the defendant’s ability to cross-examine witnesses effectively. An adverse inference instruction was warranted given the circumstances.
Facts
Officer Wasson, from a rooftop, observed Joseph engage in transactions appearing to be drug sales. He radioed Officer Wynne, who arrested Joseph and Gerzbach. Wynne seized cocaine vials from both, placing them in separate envelopes, noting names, times, and locations on the envelopes. Upon returning to the precinct, Wynne transferred the information from the envelopes to an on-line booking sheet and complaint report, then destroyed the envelopes. The prosecution disclosed the complaint report but not the envelopes. At trial, Joseph argued he was misidentified as the seller and that he was the buyer of the drugs. The defense requested an adverse-inference charge due to the destruction of the envelopes, which was denied.
Procedural History
Joseph was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the envelope information was the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed reports and irrelevant to Joseph’s identification. Joseph appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a destroyed document can be considered the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed material under the Rosario rule, such that the failure to disclose the original document does not constitute a Rosario violation.
Holding
No, because a destroyed document, unavailable for inspection, cannot be deemed the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed material, and the trial court erred in declining to give an adverse-inference instruction.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized the necessity of precise correlation between disclosed and undisclosed material to qualify for the duplicative-equivalent exception. The court stated, “a document that has been lost or destroyed and is therefore no longer available for judicial inspection cannot be deemed the ‘duplicative equivalent’ of Rosario material that has previously been disclosed.” The court reasoned that even if the contents of a destroyed document are purportedly transcribed verbatim, there can be inadvertent errors that are helpful for cross-examination. “Even where a document has purportedly been transcribed verbatim, inadvertent errors, omissions and deletions can occur, giving rise to precisely the kind of discrepancies that are most useful in cross-examination.” Testimony about the destroyed document’s contents is not an acceptable substitute. Since the destroyed envelopes could have supported Joseph’s defense of mistaken identity, the trial court abused its discretion by not giving an adverse-inference instruction. The court distinguished cases where relevance was marginal or the destruction was accidental, stating, “Given the articulable showing of prejudice that the defendant made, the unavailability of the documents from which a less conjectural showing might have been made and, finally, the circumstances of the documents’ loss, the trial court’s refusal to impose the limited sanction counsel requested constituted an abuse of discretion as a matter of law”.