85 N.Y.2d 956 (1995)

A defendant’s claim regarding the admissibility of a spontaneous statement made due to mental incapacity must be raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial to be preserved for appellate review.

Summary

Earl Dunn, an inmate at Rockland Psychiatric Center, was convicted of manslaughter and aggravated sexual abuse of a fellow inmate. After the assault, Dunn made inculpatory statements to hospital personnel while under the guard of a security officer, before receiving Miranda warnings. The lower court ruled these initial statements were spontaneous and admissible. Dunn argued subsequent statements were involuntary due to his mental incapacity, but he did not argue that his initial spontaneous statement was inadmissible due to the same mental incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the issue of whether Dunn’s mental incapacity rendered his initial spontaneous statement inadmissible was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

Facts

Earl Dunn, an inmate at Rockland Psychiatric Center, assaulted a fellow inmate. Following the assault, hospital personnel seized Dunn and transferred him to the custody of the State Police. While under the guard of a hospital security officer, Dunn made certain inculpatory statements. The lower court found that no conduct on the part of the officer was likely to elicit a statement from Dunn. Dunn later argued that subsequent statements were involuntary because his mental incapacity made it impossible for him to understand the consequences of a Miranda warning.

Procedural History

Dunn was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree. At a suppression hearing, the court ruled Dunn’s initial statements were spontaneous and admissible. Dunn appealed, arguing his subsequent statements were involuntary, but he did not raise the issue of the initial statement’s admissibility due to mental incapacity. The Appellate Division considered whether his mental incapacity might render him particularly vulnerable to coercion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the issue of the admissibility of an initial, “spontaneous” statement made by a mentally incapacitated defendant is preserved for appellate review when it was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

Holding

1. No, because the defendant did not raise the issue of the initial statement’s admissibility due to mental incapacity at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant must properly preserve an issue for appellate review by raising it at the appropriate time in the lower courts. Here, Dunn argued that subsequent statements were involuntary because of his mental incapacity, but he failed to argue that his initial “spontaneous” statement was inadmissible on the same grounds. Because the argument concerning the initial statement’s admissibility was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection to the admission of the evidence at trial, it was not preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. While the Appellate Division considered the issue in the interests of justice, this did not create a preserved question of law for the Court of Appeals to review. The court effectively applied the well-established rule that appellate courts generally only consider issues that were properly raised and preserved in the lower courts, unless there are exceptional circumstances or fundamental errors that warrant review in the interest of justice.