Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373 (1995)
In a defamation action based on allegedly false statements of fact, the court must determine whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation, giving the language a fair reading in the context of the entire publication.
Summary
Michael Armstrong, an attorney, sued Simon & Schuster for libel based on a paragraph in the book “Den of Thieves.” The paragraph described Armstrong’s representation of Craig Cogut, alleging Armstrong presented Cogut with a false affidavit to exonerate another client, Lowell Milken, which Cogut refused to sign. Armstrong claimed the paragraph was false and defamatory. The Court of Appeals held that the statement, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, was susceptible of a defamatory meaning because it implied Armstrong attempted to procure a perjured oath. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Facts
Armstrong represented Lowell Milken and later Craig Cogut, an attorney who worked with Lowell. Cogut was subpoenaed during an investigation of Wall Street dealings. Armstrong prepared an affidavit for Cogut intended to exonerate Lowell Milken. Cogut consulted other attorneys, then signed a revised affidavit. Armstrong then submitted the affidavit to the U.S. Attorney on behalf of Lowell Milken. The book “Den of Thieves” contained a paragraph stating Armstrong presented Cogut with an affidavit containing untrue facts, which Cogut angrily refused to sign, leading Cogut to seek new lawyers.
Procedural History
Armstrong sued Simon & Schuster for libel. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the statements were true or substantially true, protected by the “opinion” defense, and the “single instance” rule. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the allegedly defamatory statements in “Den of Thieves” concerning Armstrong’s conduct are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.
Holding
Yes, because viewing the statements favorably to the plaintiff, the statement that Cogut refused to sign the affidavit because the facts weren’t true is susceptible of a defamatory meaning, implying Armstrong deliberately presented a false affidavit for Cogut to sign in order to exculpate Lowell, resulting in Cogut’s angry discharge of Armstrong and the retention of new counsel.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court focused on whether the statements were reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning. The Court emphasized that it must give the disputed language a fair reading within the context of the publication. While defendants argued the paragraph was substantially true, the Court found Armstrong’s claim that he never prepared a false affidavit created a factual dispute. The Court stated, “Viewing the statements at issue most favorably to plaintiff, as we must on a dismissal motion, we conclude that this sentence, in the context in which it appears, is susceptible of a defamatory meaning: that Armstrong deliberately presented a false affidavit for one client (Cogut) to sign in order to exculpate another client (Lowell), resulting in Cogut’s angry discharge of Armstrong and the retention of new counsel.” The Court distinguished this case from defamation by implication, emphasizing that Armstrong alleged false statements of verifiable fact, not merely implications arising from truthful statements. The Court noted that Armstrong bears the burden of proving the alleged falsity. Because the court found the statement was potentially defamatory, the case could proceed.