85 N.Y.2d 265 (1995)

A new rule for criminal procedure will only be applied retroactively to cases that are already final if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe or if it alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial.

Summary

Cecilio Eastman was convicted of murder and weapon possession. His appeal centered on the admission of his non-testifying co-defendant’s confession, which implicated him in the crime, a violation of the Sixth Amendment under Cruz v. New York. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Cruz should be applied retroactively, and if so, whether admitting the co-defendant’s redacted confession constituted harmless error. The court held that Cruz should be applied retroactively because it alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial. The court also held that admitting the confession was not harmless error, mandating a new trial due to the prejudice against Eastman.

Facts

Wilfred Barrett, a security guard, was fatally shot during an attempted robbery. Barrett may have shot one of his assailants. Eastman was found at the same location with a gunshot wound. Carlos Croney and Carlos Richards were seen near the emergency room; they were believed to have information. Croney and Richards were in the car that fled the scene with Eastman, and the murder weapon was dropped off at Rubin Charles’s apartment. Croney gave a statement implicating Eastman and Richards. Eastman initially claimed he was dropped off and didn’t know who shot him. Later, he admitted Richards wanted to rob Barrett, but denied having a weapon or planning the robbery.

Procedural History

Eastman and Croney were jointly charged with murder and weapon possession. Eastman’s motion to sever the case, arguing a Bruton violation, was denied, but the court ordered Croney’s statement redacted. Eastman was convicted; the Appellate Division affirmed. After the Supreme Court decided Cruz v. New York, Eastman moved to vacate the judgment, arguing a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding harmless error. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave and reversed.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Cruz v. New York should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2. If Cruz v. New York is applied retroactively, whether the admission of the co-defendant’s confession constituted harmless error in this case.

Holding

1. Yes, because the rule announced in Cruz is central to an accurate determination of guilt or innocence.

2. No, because Eastman’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was abridged by the admission of the codefendant’s inculpatory confession.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Cruz departed from prior precedents regarding interlocking confessions. The Supreme Court stated that the interlocking nature of confessions pertains not to its harmfulness but rather its reliability (Cruz v New York, 481 US, at 192). The court determined that Cruz should be applied retroactively because it implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial, a bedrock procedural element. Retroactive application of Cruz is constitutionally commanded on collateral review. Analyzing harmless error, the court found that the co-defendant’s statement prejudiced Eastman, especially considering Eastman’s attempt to repudiate his earlier statements. The court found it probable the jury would not accept the defense theory. The statement linked Eastman to the crime and ascribed intent to him. Consequently, the court found that Eastman’s conviction resulted from the violation of his Sixth Amendment right and ordered a new trial. The dissent argued that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because ballistics evidence tied Eastman to the crime scene. In the dissent’s view, Eastman’s acknowledgment of presence and other activity at the crime scene confirm beyond the sphere of reasonable doubt. The dissent concludes the error does not bear any reasonable possibility of having affected the jury’s verdict.