84 N.Y.2d 749 (1995)
Police may not stop a moving vehicle solely to request information from the driver about a third-party suspect’s whereabouts without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they stopped a moving vehicle solely to ask the driver about the location of a suspect in a prior assault. The police stopped the vehicle based on a tip from the assault victim that the driver was a friend of the suspect and might know his location. The Court reasoned that stopping a vehicle is a greater intrusion than stopping a pedestrian and requires reasonable suspicion, not just a desire to gather information. The evidence obtained as a result of the stop was therefore suppressed.
Facts
On May 17, 1989, police officers received a report of an assault with a gun that occurred the previous day. The officers picked up the complainant (victim) and drove around the neighborhood looking for the suspect. The complainant identified the defendant, who was driving a double-parked car, as a friend of the suspect. As the defendant began to drive away, the officers stopped him using their lights and horn, intending to ask about the suspect’s whereabouts. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers saw marijuana in plain view and subsequently found a loaded revolver under the driver’s seat.
Procedural History
The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and marijuana. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that the police had the right to stop the vehicle to request information. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on People v. John BB., which permitted stops pursuant to a uniform roadblock. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Whether police may stop a moving vehicle to request information from the driver regarding the whereabouts of a criminal suspect, without reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime?
Holding
No, because the stop of an automobile is a seizure that implicates constitutional limitations, requiring at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and the governmental interest in investigating past criminal conduct does not outweigh the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights in this context.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that stopping an automobile is a greater intrusion than stopping a pedestrian and thus requires greater justification. While police have the right to request information from citizens, this right does not include the right to unlawfully seize them. Stopping a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court distinguished this case from permissible stops such as routine traffic checks or stops based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Here, the police lacked reasonable suspicion; they only wanted to ask the defendant for information about a third party. The Court balanced the government’s interest in investigating a past crime against the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, finding the intrusion unjustified under the circumstances. The Court noted the importance of avoiding unchecked police discretion and the availability of less intrusive alternatives. The court highlighted that “the Fourth Amendment does not permit the stopping of potential witnesses to the same extent as those suspected of crime.” The Court distinguished People v. John BB., emphasizing the lack of objective standards circumscribing the officers’ discretion in this case. A dissenting opinion argued that the stop was reasonable given the violent nature of the underlying crime and the victim’s belief that the defendant knew the suspect’s location, suggesting there was a preventative governmental interest in the stop as well as an investigative one, and the intrusion was minimal. The dissent further argued that it was reasonable for the officers to believe the defendant had fresh information about the suspect’s location at that very moment and that the police action was not arbitrary.