85 N.Y.2d 71 (1995)
To exclude the period when a bench warrant is outstanding from speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30(4)(c), the prosecution must demonstrate due diligence in attempting to locate the defendant during that entire period; a lack of diligence during any portion of the period renders that portion non-excludable.
Summary
Luperon was charged with attempted murder. After his release, he failed to appear in court, and a bench warrant was issued. More than 15 months later, Luperon moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the People’s statement of readiness was untimely. The court addressed whether the entire period the bench warrant was outstanding was excludable, even though there was a 69-day gap before efforts to execute the warrant began. The Court of Appeals held that the 69-day period was not excludable because the police’s subsequent efforts did not retroactively excuse their prior inaction. Because the delay exceeded the statutory limit, the indictment should have been dismissed.
Facts
Luperon was arraigned on a felony complaint for shooting his landlord on August 2, 1989, and released on August 4. He failed to appear on September 14, 1989, and a bench warrant was issued. He was arrested on unrelated charges on October 16, 1989, and released again on October 20, 1989, while the Grand Jury had not acted. He was indicted on December 8, 1989, but never received notice of his indictment or an arraignment date. An ex parte arrest order was issued on December 19, 1989. Luperon was not located until October 5, 1990, after being spotted by his former landlady. The People declared readiness on October 26, 1990.
Procedural History
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging the People were unready for 451 days. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. Luperon was convicted of first-degree assault and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the police demonstrated diligence. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the People can exclude the entire period a bench warrant is outstanding under CPL 30.30(4)(c) when there was a period of 69 days between the issuance of the warrant and the start of efforts to execute it.
Holding
No, because a showing of diligent efforts to execute the bench warrant is a prerequisite to the application of the statutory exclusion. The 69 days of delay between the warrant’s issuance and assignment for enforcement are not excludable.
Court’s Reasoning
CPL 30.30(4)(c) excludes the period a bench warrant is outstanding if the defendant is absent or unavailable, defined as location unknown with attempts to avoid apprehension, or presence for trial cannot be obtained with due diligence. The Court stated a showing of diligent efforts to execute the warrant is a prerequisite to applying the exclusion. While diligence is a mixed question of law and fact, the Court may inquire whether the fact finder’s conclusions are supported by the record.
The Court rejected the People’s argument to excuse the pre-assignment delay for “reasonable administrative delay.” The Court reasoned that the “due diligence” standard is flexible enough to consider processing demands where warranted by the facts. The Court clarified they were not holding that time spent processing a warrant is always chargeable to the People.
The Court held because the People failed to offer any basis for excluding the 160 days of delay during other periods and the 69-day delay between the warrant issuance and assignment, the total unexcused delay exceeded the statutorily permitted time. The Court noted that “[t]hose officials are bound by their oaths of office to make all reasonable efforts to enforce judicially issued warrants.”