People v. Baghai-Kermani, 84 N.Y.2d 525 (1994): Scope of Rosario Violation Reversal for Multiple Counts

People v. Baghai-Kermani, 84 N.Y.2d 525 (1994)

A Rosario violation (failure to disclose a witness’s pretrial statements) requires reversal of convictions only on counts for which the witness gave testimony, unless the tainted counts had a prejudicial spillover effect on other counts due to the nature of the evidence and arguments presented.

Summary

Defendant, a psychiatrist, was convicted on ten counts of illegally selling prescriptions. A Rosario violation occurred when the prosecution failed to disclose pretrial statements of a witness (Karp) who testified about two of the counts. The Court of Appeals addressed whether this violation required reversal of all ten convictions. The Court held that the Rosario violation only mandated reversal of the two counts related to Karp’s testimony because the other counts involved separate sales to different individuals, and the evidence on the tainted counts did not significantly influence the guilty verdicts on the remaining counts.

Facts

Defendant, a psychiatrist, was charged with ten counts of criminal sale of a prescription for a controlled substance. The charges stemmed from visits by four individuals posing as patients: three “shoppers” employed by the Special Prosecutor for Medicaid Fraud Control (Dawson, Kirton, and Williams), and an investigator from the New York State Bureau of Controlled Substances (Karp). Each “patient” paid a fee for a brief “session” with defendant, during which they requested specific controlled substances. Defendant then provided prescriptions without a legitimate medical purpose. Karp testified at trial regarding two sales he made with the doctor.

Procedural History

Defendant was convicted on all ten counts after a bench trial. After sentencing, defendant learned of undisclosed tape recordings of pretrial statements made by investigator Karp. Defendant moved to set aside the judgment under CPL 440.10, arguing a Rosario violation. The trial court vacated all ten convictions. The Appellate Division modified, reinstating the convictions on the eight counts unrelated to Karp’s testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose investigator Karp’s taped pretrial statements requires reversal of all ten convictions, including the eight counts for which Karp did not testify?

Holding

1. No, because the Rosario violation only taints the two convictions directly related to Karp’s testimony, and there was no significant spillover effect on the other counts.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the Rosario rule is one of fundamental fairness, and the per se reversal rule is based on the difficulty of assessing the potential impeachment value of withheld material. However, extending the per se reversal rule to unrelated charges would be an unwarranted expansion of the policy. The court stated, “Indeed, in those situations, the handicap visited on the defense as a result of the nondisclosure cannot reasonably or logically be said to have had any impact at all on the manner in which the unrelated charges were litigated.”

The Court acknowledged the possibility of a “spillover” effect where the tainted counts may have influenced the other counts. However, the Court found no reasonable possibility that the evidence supporting the two tainted counts influenced the guilty verdicts on the other eight. Each count involved a discrete sale to a single buyer-witness, and each buyer-witness’s evidence directly related only to the sales made to him or her. The court noted the large number of counts, the uniformity of the evidence, and the strength of independent proof regarding the defendant’s culpable mental state. The court noted that the prosecutor focused on the sales to James Dawson, and not the sales to investigator Karp in summation. Therefore, reversal of the eight counts on which Karp did not testify was not warranted.

Regarding the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court stated that the defendant, having chosen to represent himself, must bear the consequences of his decisions.