Scheiber v. St. John’s University, 84 N.Y.2d 120 (1994)
A religious institution’s exemption from anti-discrimination laws, under New York Executive Law § 296(11), permits preferential hiring of individuals sharing the same faith to promote its religious principles, but does not allow for wholesale discrimination based on religion unrelated to those principles.
Summary
Donald Scheiber, a Jewish former Vice-President of Student Life at St. John’s University (SJU), sued after being fired, alleging religious discrimination. SJU claimed the firing was due to poor performance and asserted an affirmative defense under Executive Law § 296(11), allowing religious institutions to prefer employees of the same religion. The New York Court of Appeals held that while SJU qualifies as a religious institution under the statute, summary judgment was inappropriate because there were disputed issues of fact as to whether SJU was actually exercising its statutory preference or engaging in unlawful discrimination.
Facts
Donald Scheiber, a Jewish man, worked at St. John’s University (SJU) for 20 years, eventually becoming Vice-President of Student Life. After a new University President was appointed, Scheiber was fired. SJU is operated in connection with the Vincentian order, a Roman Catholic religious organization. Scheiber claimed that the new administration, particularly the President’s preference for Vincentians, was a pretext for religious discrimination, violating state and federal laws, and that he was singled out for increased scrutiny as the only Jewish Vice-President. SJU maintained Scheiber was terminated due to poor job performance and invoked its right to prefer Roman Catholics in certain positions.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court granted SJU’s motion for summary judgment under Executive Law § 296(11), finding that SJU could prefer a Roman Catholic for the Vice President of Student Life position. The Appellate Division affirmed. Scheiber appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether St. John’s University, as an institution operated in connection with a religious order, is entitled to claim the religious exemption under Executive Law § 296(11)?
Whether, even if SJU is a religious institution, the exemption under Executive Law § 296(11) automatically entitles it to summary judgment against a claim of religious discrimination?
Holding
Yes, SJU is a religious institution entitled to claim the exemption because it is an educational organization operated in connection with the Vincentian order.
No, because disputed issues of fact existed as to whether the University was exercising the preference allowed by statute or engaging in unlawful discrimination, therefore, SJU did not establish a basis for summary judgment.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals determined that SJU qualified as a religious institution under Executive Law § 296(11) because it is an educational organization connected with the Vincentian order. However, the court emphasized that the religious exemption is not a license for wholesale discrimination. Citing Matter of Klein (Hartnett), 78 NY2d 662, 667, the court stated that the Human Rights Law should be read to accomplish its anti-discriminatory purpose, and the exemption is narrow, intended to allow preference in hiring to promote religious principles. The court found that the exemption operates to exclude from the definition of “discrimination” exercise of a preference in hiring for persons of the same faith where that action is calculated by the institution to effectuate its religious mission. A religious employer may not discriminate against an individual for reasons having nothing to do with the free exercise of religion and then invoke the exemption as a shield against its unlawful conduct. The court noted SJU’s denial of preferential hiring and its advertisement as an equal opportunity employer contradicted its defense. Because SJU did not conclusively demonstrate that it fired Scheiber to promote its religious principles by hiring a Catholic replacement, a genuine issue of material fact remained, precluding summary judgment. The court emphasized the absence of an undisputed factual predicate to delve into complex constitutional issues of Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.