People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993)
A defendant’s right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors, particularly when those discussions concern potential juror bias, is a statutory right under New York law (CPL 260.20), not a constitutional right.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals clarified that a defendant’s right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors is based on state statute (CPL 260.20) and not on constitutional grounds. The defendant argued that because the voir dire questioning concerned “specific bias,” his right to be present was constitutional, making the rule retroactive. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the right to be present at voir dire sidebars is statutory, whether the inquiry concerns “specific” or “general” bias, and therefore not retroactive under People v. Mitchell. This case distinguishes between the statutory right to be present and instances where no such right exists, emphasizing that the presence of counsel alone may suffice in certain ancillary proceedings.
Facts
Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine to an undercover officer. During jury selection (voir dire), several prospective jurors indicated potential bias or familiarity with the defendant, his family, or the crime location during sidebar discussions with the judge. These discussions occurred outside the defendant’s hearing, although defense counsel participated. The defendant objected to the jury’s racial composition after it was impaneled but did not object to his absence from the sidebar conferences during jury selection.
Procedural History
The Appellate Division initially reversed the conviction based on People v. Antommarchi, which addressed a defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences. However, the Court of Appeals subsequently held in People v. Mitchell that the Antommarchi rule was prospective only. The People’s motion for reargument, considering the Mitchell decision, was denied. The case reached the Court of Appeals to determine if the defendant’s situation was distinguishable from Antommarchi, warranting retroactive application.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences during voir dire, where questioning concerned potential jurors’ specific biases, is a constitutional right that should be applied retroactively.
Holding
No, because the right to be present at voir dire sidebars, regardless of whether the inquiry concerns specific or general bias, is conferred solely by CPL 260.20, making it a statutory right, not a constitutional one, and therefore subject to prospective application only.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at core proceedings where witnesses or evidence are presented, the right to be present at ancillary proceedings, such as voir dire sidebars, is governed by CPL 260.20. The court emphasized that the state statute provides broader protection than the federal constitution. The Court distinguished the case from situations like People v. Velasco, where sidebar inquiry is directed only to ministerial matters (availability for jury service), in which case the statutory right isn’t even triggered. In People v. Sloan, the court had explained that where bias is at issue, a defendant’s presence would permit assessment of a juror’s facial expressions and demeanor. However, the court clarified that reliance on Snyder v. Massachusetts in the context of the state statutory right is to construe the scope of the statutory right. The court stated, “Under our own body of State law, we now look to the effect that defendant’s absence might have on the opportunity to defend as measure of whether the statutory right to be present at an ancillary trial proceeding is triggered.” The court concluded that the defendant’s claim is determined by People v. Mitchell and cannot be given retroactive effect.