People v. Weinberg, 83 N.Y.2d 262 (1994)
A statute is not applied retroactively when it applies to future transactions, even if those transactions are founded upon antecedent events; enhanced penalties for repeat offenses do not violate ex post facto laws when applied to offenses committed after the law’s enactment, even if prior offenses occurred before.
Summary
Weinberg was convicted of failure to file tax returns and repeated failure to file, a felony under Tax Law § 1802, based on failures in 1983, 1984, and 1985. He argued the felony charge was an improper retroactive application of the law and violated ex post facto principles. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the law wasn’t retroactive because the last failure to file (1985) occurred after the law’s enactment. The court also ruled that the enhanced penalty for repeated offenses didn’t violate ex post facto principles because it was a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, not additional punishment for earlier non-filings.
Facts
Defendant failed to file New York State personal income tax returns for 1983, 1984, and 1985. In 1985, New York enacted the Omnibus Tax Equity and Enforcement Act, which included Tax Law § 1802, making repeated failure to file a felony. Weinberg filed the delinquent returns in August 1987, after being indicted. He was then convicted of misdemeanor counts for each year and a felony count for repeated failure to file.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted Weinberg on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the application of Tax Law § 1802 to Weinberg’s failure to file tax returns, based in part on failures occurring before the statute’s effective date, constitutes an improper retroactive application of the statute.
2. Whether applying Tax Law § 1802 to Weinberg constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law.
3. Whether the trial court erred in giving supplemental instructions to the jury regarding the timeliness element of the offenses.
4. Whether the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from presenting the concept of jury nullification during summation.
Holding
1. No, because Tax Law § 1802 was applied to the 1985 failure to file, which occurred after the statute’s effective date.
2. No, because Weinberg committed the repeated failure to file offense after section 1802’s effective date; the law didn’t punish acts innocent when performed or enhance punishment for a crime after its commission.
3. No, because the trial court has a duty to respond meaningfully to the jury’s inquiry, and the supplemental instruction was a correction to assure the jury was not deliberating under a misapprehension of the law.
4. No, because encouraging jury nullification would contravene the trial court’s authority to instruct the jury that they must follow and properly apply the law.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that Tax Law § 1802 was not applied retroactively because the defendant “committed” the offense when he failed to file his 1985 tax return by April 15, 1986, after the law’s effective date. The court noted that “[a] statute is not retroactive * * * when made to apply to future transactions, merely because such transactions relate to and are founded upon antecedent events”. The court also pointed to a companion bill providing for a tax amnesty period, indicating the legislature intended § 1802 to take effect relatively soon after its enactment.
Regarding the ex post facto argument, the Court relied on People v. Morse, stating that the conviction under § 1802 “‘is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier [nonfilings]. It is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one’”. The Court emphasized that the defendant had fair warning that failing to file in 1985 would result in criminal liability under § 1802.
On the jury instruction issue, the Court cited CPL 310.30, noting the trial court must give requested information or instruction it deems proper. The timeliness instruction was deemed a meaningful response to the jury’s request for a recapitulation of all elements, especially given the defendant’s ultimate failure to file timely returns.
Finally, the Court cited People v. Goetz, stating that while a jury can acquit despite finding the prosecution has proven its case, this “‘mercy-dispensing power’ * * * is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court”.