82 N.Y.2d 638 (1993)
The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cannot be used to mitigate a charge of depraved indifference murder in New York.
Summary
Defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder for killing his acquaintance. He argued that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance should apply to mitigate the charge, similar to intentional murder. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the Penal Law does not allow for this defense in cases of depraved indifference murder. The court emphasized that while historically, “heat of passion” could mitigate both intentional and depraved mind murder, the modern statute explicitly limits the extreme emotional disturbance defense to intentional murder charges. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no basis to extend the defense beyond the statute’s clear language.
Facts
Delphi Cox was found murdered in her apartment. The defendant, after spending the afternoon and evening smoking crack cocaine and drinking beer with Cox, stabbed and strangled her. He then stole and sold her belongings for more drugs. He was charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.
Procedural History
The defendant was tried in a New York State court. The trial court instructed the jury that extreme emotional disturbance could mitigate intentional murder to manslaughter but refused to extend the instruction to the depraved indifference murder charge. The jury acquitted the defendant of intentional murder and manslaughter but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance can be used to mitigate a charge of depraved indifference murder under Penal Law § 125.25(2).
Holding
No, because the plain language of Penal Law § 125.25 only allows the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to mitigate a charge of intentional murder, not depraved indifference murder.
Court’s Reasoning
The court relied on the explicit wording of Penal Law § 125.25, which defines different types of murder but only includes the extreme emotional disturbance defense in the section concerning intentional murder. The court rejected the defendant’s historical argument that “heat of passion” had always been a mitigating defense to depraved indifference murder, clarifying that under prior New York statutes, heat of passion was an element of manslaughter, not a defense to murder. The court also distinguished between “heat of passion” and “extreme emotional disturbance,” noting that the latter embodies a more sophisticated understanding of mental trauma and does not negate intent, unlike the former. The court stated, “The opportunity opened for mitigation [by the extreme emotional disturbance defense] differs significantly from the traditional heat of passion defense.” The court emphasized that extending the defense to depraved indifference murder would require a policy choice by the Legislature, which had not been made. Finally, the court found that not including the affirmative defense in the depraved mind murder statute did not raise concerns about due process, because the People remain responsible for proving the fundamental elements of mens rea and actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.