People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247 (1992)
An attorney’s on-the-record consent, in the defendant’s presence, to allow a deliberating jury to go home overnight, constitutes a valid waiver of the statutory jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10, without requiring explicit personal consent from the defendant.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an attorney’s stipulation, made in open court and in the defendant’s presence, to allow a jury to go home overnight after deliberations had begun, constituted a valid waiver of the jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10. The Court held that such consent by counsel effectively waived the statutory requirement. The court reasoned that the sequestration provision does not implicate fundamental trial rights and is purely statutory. Therefore, the attorney’s waiver was sufficient without explicit personal consent from the defendant.
Facts
After the jury retired to deliberate, the defendant’s attorney stipulated, on the record and in the defendant’s presence, that the jury could go home overnight. CPL 310.10 requires that a deliberating jury “must be continuously kept together under the supervision of a court officer or court officers.” The defendant later argued that the waiver of this sequestration requirement was invalid because he did not personally consent to it.
Procedural History
The lower court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether an attorney’s on-the-record consent, in the presence of the defendant, to allow a deliberating jury to go home overnight, constitutes a valid waiver of the statutory jury sequestration requirement under CPL 310.10, absent explicit personal consent from the defendant.
Holding
Yes, because the sequestration provision of CPL 310.10 is statutory and does not implicate fundamental rights, an attorney’s consent to waive the sequestration requirement, made in open court and in the defendant’s presence, is sufficient to waive the requirement even without explicit personal consent from the defendant.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, where it established that a defendant could waive the CPL 310.10 jury sequestration requirement. The Court clarified that Webb did not mandate that the defendant personally consent to the waiver or that the record reflect a discussion between counsel and the defendant regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver. The Court emphasized that “the sequestration provision does not implicate fundamental rights that are an integral part of the trial; rather, the requirement ‘is entirely statutory and reflects no established common-law right of the defendant’ (78 NY2d 335, 339-340, supra; see, id., at 340, n).” The court analogized to other situations where attorney consent is binding on the client, referencing Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237; People v Ferguson, 67 NY2d 383, 390; People v Rosen, 81 NY2d 237, 244-245. Therefore, because the attorney stipulated before the court, on the record, and in the presence of the defendant, that the jury be permitted to go home overnight after it had commenced deliberations, such consent effectively waived the statutory sequestration requirement.