82 N.Y.2d 77 (1993)
CPLR 214-c(2), the statute of limitations for property damage caused by exposure to substances, applies to actions for damages resulting from continuing trespass and nuisance, limiting the time to bring suit to three years from the date of discovery of the injury.
Summary
Plaintiffs sued General Electric (GE) and Albert J. Smaldone, Sr. and Sons, Inc., alleging property damage from hazardous waste contamination. GE had disposed of waste on a site later purchased by Smaldone. Plaintiffs discovered the contamination in 1986 but did not sue until 1990. The lower courts disagreed about whether the claim was time-barred under CPLR 214-c(2). The Court of Appeals held that the statute applied to continuing trespass and nuisance claims, barring the recovery of damages because the suit was filed more than three years after discovery, but did not affect the availability of equitable injunctive relief.
Facts
From 1958 to 1969, General Electric disposed of hazardous waste at the Moreau Site. In 1970, Albert J. Smaldone, Sr. and Sons, Inc. purchased the site. In 1984, GE contacted plaintiff Perkett for permission to place monitoring wells on her property. GE informed Perkett in December 1984 that her property was contaminated with trichloroethylene (TCE). In 1986, Perkett and Jensen took title to the property as joint tenants. GE sent Jensen technical data and notified him that wells on his property showed contamination.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs commenced an action in June 1990, seeking damages and an injunction. The defendants moved to dismiss based on CPLR 214-c(2). The Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division modified the order and reinstated the causes of action for damages and injunctive relief based on continuing trespass and nuisance. The Court of Appeals then modified the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the damages claims.
Issue(s)
Whether CPLR 214-c(2) applies to actions for damages caused by continuing trespass and nuisance, thereby limiting the time to bring such actions to three years from the date the injury was discovered.
Holding
Yes, because CPLR 214-c(2) applies to actions for “injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance,” encompassing continuing trespass and nuisance actions seeking damages. It does not affect the availability of equitable injunctive relief.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that CPLR 214-c(2) is a comprehensive statute designed to provide relief to injured parties who were previously barred from suing due to the old accrual rule, which started the statute of limitations running from the date of exposure. The court found no evidence that the legislature intended to exempt continuing nuisance and continuing trespass actions from the statute’s scope. The statute’s language is broad and inclusive, covering “injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance.” The Court emphasized that it would be ironic for the courts to reformulate the enacted version of this statute. The purpose of CPLR 214-c (2) was to replace the archaic rule, which commences the three-year period for suit on the date that an exposure occurs. The court acknowledged that pre-CPLR 214-c(2), a common-law exception existed for continuing wrongs, but found that the new statute displaced the rationale for this exception, providing a balanced approach that protects both plaintiffs and defendants. The discovery rule allows plaintiffs who act timely to sue for all damages incurred since the wrong began, while defendants are not left potentially liable in perpetuity. As the statute applies only to actions “to recover damages,” it does not affect the availability of injunctive equitable relief. Dissenting opinions argued that the statute was only intended to address the accrual rule and not to abrogate common law rights related to continuing wrongs and that the majority’s approach compels plaintiffs to speculate about future economic loss.