82 N.Y.2d 47 (1993)
New York public policy does not prohibit an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provision that authorizes an employee of a party to a contract dispute, even one personally involved in the dispute, to make conclusive, final, and binding decisions, especially when judicial review is provided.
Summary
Westinghouse contracted with the NYCTA and MTA for power rectifier equipment. Disputes arose, and the contract included an ADR provision where the NYCTA’s Chief Electrical Officer (Westfall) would resolve disputes. Westinghouse submitted a claim to Westfall, who rejected it. Westinghouse sued, arguing the ADR provision was against public policy. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether such an ADR provision is enforceable under New York public policy. The Court of Appeals held that the ADR provision, including an interested adjudicator, was enforceable because it did not violate public policy, especially because the agreement provided for judicial review.
Facts
In 1983, Westinghouse entered into a contract with the NYCTA and MTA. The contract contained an ADR provision, Article 8.03, which stated that the Superintendent (an NYCTA employee) would decide all questions arising out of the contract, and his decision would be conclusive, final, and binding. Westinghouse notified Westfall, the NYCTA’s Chief Electrical Officer and Superintendent, of outstanding design problems. Westinghouse later suspended performance, which Westfall deemed a breach. Westinghouse then submitted a request for additional compensation to Westfall. Westfall rejected Westinghouse’s claims.
Procedural History
Westinghouse sued in the Southern District of New York, arguing that Article 8.03 contravened New York public policy. The District Court upheld the enforceability of the provision. Westinghouse appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified the question of the ADR provision’s validity under New York public policy to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether New York public policy prohibits an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provision that authorizes an employee of a party to a contract dispute, where such employee is personally involved in the dispute, to make conclusive, final, and binding decisions on all questions arising under the contract.
Holding
No, because the ADR provision does not violate New York public policy when it expressly provides for judicial review.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized New York’s strong public policy favoring arbitration and ADR, noting that these mechanisms are an effective and expeditious means of resolving disputes. The court relied on precedent such as Matter of Siegel (Lewis), 40 N.Y.2d 687, stating that “a fully known relationship between an arbitrator and a party, including one as close as employer and employee * * * will not in and of itself disqualify the designee.” The court emphasized that Westinghouse knowingly accepted the terms of the contract, including the ADR clause. The court reasoned that allowing Westinghouse to challenge the ADR provision after the fact, while retaining the benefits of the contract, would have destabilizing commercial law consequences. The court noted the importance of the judicial review provision, stating that review under CPLR article 78 allows broader review than the usual standards of arbitration award review. While acknowledging the power imbalance between municipalities and contractors, the court declined to intervene in arm’s-length commercial dealings absent compelling reasons. The court stated that the judicial review provision was sufficient to regulate abuses. Finally, the court highlighted the potential impact on numerous existing contracts with similar ADR provisions if the provision were deemed unenforceable, arguing against disrupting reliably perceived public policy in New York. The Court referenced Cardozo, stating that “The rule of law should not suddenly be changed to dislodge reliably perceived public policy in New York, which encourages parties to agree to submit their disputes to forums and persons for prompt, efficient and fair resolution, by their reckoning, not that of the courts, after the fact.”