Nestor v. Diamond, 79 N.Y.2d 490 (1992)
RPAPL 753(4), which allows a tenant to cure a lease violation within ten days to avoid eviction, applies to ejectment actions commenced in the Supreme Court, not just summary proceedings in Civil Court.
Summary
This case addresses whether a tenant can utilize RPAPL 753(4) to cure a lease breach in an ejectment action brought in Supreme Court, or if that remedy is limited to summary proceedings in Civil Court. The plaintiff, a cooperative apartment owner, sought to eject the defendant tenants for installing a washing machine without permission. The Court of Appeals held that RPAPL 753(4) applies to ejectment actions in Supreme Court, reasoning that the statute is remedial and should be liberally construed to allow tenants to cure breaches and remain in possession. The Court also denied the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees, as she did not prevail on the central issue of possession.
Facts
The defendant, Helene Diamond, resided in a rent-stabilized apartment since 1965. The plaintiff, Marianne Nestor, purchased the apartment in 1982 subject to the defendant’s tenancy. In 1983, the plaintiff served notices to cure on the defendants for installing a washing machine and associated plumbing without the landlord’s consent. In 1985, the plaintiff initiated an ejectment action in Supreme Court, alleging breach of the lease.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court found a technical breach of the lease but granted the defendant time to cure the violation. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that RPAPL 753(4) was available in an ejectment action in Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether RPAPL 753(4), which allows a tenant to cure a lease violation to avoid eviction, applies to ejectment actions commenced in the Supreme Court.
Holding
Yes, because RPAPL 753(4) is a remedial statute that should be liberally construed to permit tenants to cure lease violations and remain in possession, regardless of whether the action is brought in Civil Court as a summary proceeding or in Supreme Court as an ejectment action.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that RPAPL 753(4) is procedural and remedial and should be liberally construed to spread its beneficial effects as widely as possible. The statute aims to allow tenants to remain in possession by curing violations after adjudication and obviates the need for tenants to seek a Yellowstone injunction. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the reference to “warrant” in the statute limits its applicability to Civil Court summary proceedings, stating that such a construction would frustrate the statute’s purpose. The Court quoted Killington Investors v. Leino, 148 AD2d 334, 336, stating that a residential tenant who forebears from commencing a declaratory judgment, believing that he [or she] can obtain complete relief in the Civil Court, would be deprived of the benefit of the statute if the landlord unexpectedly commences an action for ejectment in Supreme Court instead of a summary holdover proceeding in the Civil Court, if we were to hold that RPAPL 753 (4) [does] not apply. The result would clearly frustrate the very purpose underlying the statute. The Court also noted the Supreme Court’s broad constitutional jurisdiction, which includes “‘all cases of every description in law and equity, from the most important and complicated to the most simple and insignificant’.” The Court concluded that the Legislature’s creation of new remedies tracked to a particular court does not divest the Supreme Court of its general power. Finally, the Court denied the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees, as she did not prevail on the central issue of obtaining a possessory judgment, stating that Ordinarily, only a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees.