People v. W., 78 N.Y.2d 734 (1991)
When time is not an essential element of an offense, an indictment, supplemented by a bill of particulars, alleging the time of the offense in approximate terms must set forth a time interval which reasonably protects the defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the accusation to prepare a defense and avoid double jeopardy.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the permissible time frame specified in an indictment for child sex abuse, specifically rape and sodomy. The defendant was convicted of multiple counts, but the Appellate Division dismissed them due to the five-month period specified in the bill of particulars. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a five-month period is not per se unreasonable and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to review the specific circumstances using established criteria to determine if the defendant was adequately informed to prepare a defense.
Facts
The defendant was charged with multiple counts of rape, sodomy, and endangering the welfare of child victims. The indictment initially stated the offenses occurred between August 1, 1984, and May 3, 1985. A bill of particulars narrowed this time frame to August 1, 1984, through December 31, 1984, a five-month period. The trial court’s instructions to the jury reflected this narrowed timeframe.
Procedural History
The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division dismissed all counts, granting leave for the People to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury, finding the five-month period per se excessive. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a five-month period specified in a bill of particulars for the commission of rape and sodomy against a child is per se so excessive as to violate the defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, thus precluding the defendant from presenting a defense.
Holding
No, because the determination of whether sufficient specificity has been provided to the defendant must be made on an ad hoc basis, considering all relevant circumstances, and a five-month period is not per se unreasonable. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to make that determination.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals stated that an indictment must contain a statement indicating the charged offense was committed on, or about, a designated date or period of time (CPL 200.50[6]). When time is not an essential element, the indictment, as supplemented by a bill of particulars, may allege the time in approximate terms. The critical inquiry is whether the time interval reasonably protects the defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the accusation, enabling preparation of a defense and preventing double jeopardy. The Court acknowledged that an interval could be so excessive on its face as to warrant dismissal but emphasized that this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Citing People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 294, the court reiterated the need to protect defendant’s right to be informed of the accusation. The Court outlined a non-exclusive list of factors, originally developed in People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 419, and People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 295-296, to be considered, including the length of the time span, the knowledge the People possess of the dates of the criminal conduct, the age and intelligence of the victim and other witnesses, the nature of the offenses, and other surrounding circumstances. The Court noted the five-month period was longer than the three-week period in Morris, but shorter than the nine-month period in People v. Beauchamp, 74 N.Y.2d 639. The Court concluded that the Appellate Division erred in applying a per se rule, thus curtailing its full appellate review, and remitted the case for further consideration under the appropriate legal standard and principles.