Thoreson v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 80 N.Y.2d 490 (1992)
In a court action brought under Executive Law § 297(9) for violations of the New York Human Rights Law, punitive damages are not recoverable.
Summary
Thoreson sued Penthouse International, Ltd. and Robert Guccione, alleging sexual harassment and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court awarded compensatory and substantial punitive damages. The Appellate Division affirmed the compensatory award but vacated the punitive damages. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plain language and legislative history of Executive Law § 297(9) indicate that the legislature did not intend to allow punitive damages in court actions for Human Rights Law violations, especially given that such damages are not permitted in administrative proceedings before the State Division of Human Rights, except in specific housing discrimination cases.
Facts
Thoreson, a former employee of Penthouse International, Ltd., alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment. She claimed Guccione coerced her into having sexual relations with his business associates as a condition of her employment, constituting quid pro quo harassment.
Procedural History
Thoreson filed suit in Supreme Court, which found in her favor and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The Appellate Division affirmed the compensatory damages but vacated the punitive damages award. Both parties appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave.
Issue(s)
Whether punitive damages are permissible in a statutory action under Executive Law § 297(9) for violations of the New York Human Rights Law.
Holding
No, because the language and legislative history of Executive Law § 297(9) do not indicate a legislative intent to allow punitive damages in court actions for Human Rights Law violations, and such damages are generally not permitted in administrative proceedings before the State Division of Human Rights, except in housing discrimination cases.
Court’s Reasoning
The court focused on the statutory language of Executive Law § 297(9), which creates a cause of action for “damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate.” The court reasoned that “damages” in this context refers to remedies intended to alleviate the harm suffered by the aggrieved party, not to punish the wrongdoer. Punitive damages, by contrast, serve as a warning to others and are intended as punishment. The court emphasized that in administrative proceedings before the State Division of Human Rights, the focus is on rectifying the wrong to the injured party, not on punishing the transgressor.
The court highlighted the legislative history of the Human Rights Law, noting that the Legislature rejected a proposal to empower the State Division to award exemplary damages. Furthermore, in 1991, the Legislature added a specific provision for punitive damages in cases of housing discrimination only, suggesting that such damages were not intended to be recoverable in other types of discrimination cases. The court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court quoted from the State Division’s memorandum: “At present the Human Rights Law * * * [p]ermits only compensatory damages to aggrieved persons.”
The Court reasoned that allowing punitive damages in court actions would be incompatible with the remedial nature of the Human Rights Law and would encourage aggrieved persons to bypass the administrative process in favor of court proceedings where they could seek punitive damages. The Court stated, “It would seem highly improbable that the Legislature in adopting Executive Law § 297 (9) could have intended to permit the recovery of punitive damages in a court proceeding when that relief is expressly excluded in a proceeding before the State Division.”