People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 524 (1992)
A new rule of criminal procedure regarding a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection will generally be applied prospectively only, considering the purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice.
Summary
This case addresses whether the rule established in People v. Antommarchi, which expanded a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection, should be applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals held that the Antommarchi rule, based on state statutory law, should be applied prospectively only. The Court considered the purpose of the rule, the extent of reliance on the old practice, and the potential impact on the administration of justice. Because the prior procedure was long-standing and a retroactive application would create a substantial burden, the Court declined to apply the new rule retroactively.
Facts
The defendants in these consolidated appeals were tried before the Court of Appeals decided People v. Antommarchi. During jury selection, portions of the examination of prospective jurors occurred at sidebar conferences outside the presence of the defendants. These conferences covered topics such as whether jurors or their relatives had been crime victims or involved in criminal proceedings. The defendants did not object to their exclusion from these sidebars.
Procedural History
The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions of Mitchell and Casiano. The Appellate Division also affirmed Chambers’ conviction initially, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order in Chambers due to a Batson violation (racial discrimination in jury selection), while affirming the orders in Mitchell and Casiano after determining that the Antommarchi rule should not be applied retroactively.
Issue(s)
- Whether the rule established in People v. Antommarchi, regarding a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection, should be applied retroactively.
Holding
- No, because the Antommarchi rule is based on state statutory law, and applying the factors outlined in People v. Pepper (purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and effect on the administration of justice) favors prospective application only.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the Antommarchi decision was based on New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 260.20), which requires a defendant to be present during trial, a right extended to jury impanelment under state law. While this right has due process underpinnings, its scope is broader than federal constitutional rights. The Court distinguished the statutory right from the federal constitutional right to be present, which is evaluated based on whether a defendant’s absence would thwart a fair hearing. Because the questioning involved matters of general bias and hostility, the Court found no violation of the defendants’ constitutional rights under the pre-Antommarchi standard.
The Court then applied the retroactivity analysis from People v. Pepper, which considers the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice. The purpose of the Antommarchi rule is to permit a more active role for the defendant in jury selection, not to cure a constitutional infirmity. Courts had substantially relied on the prior practice of examining jurors in the defendant’s absence to expedite jury selection and encourage candor. Retroactive application would create a substantial burden on the administration of justice by requiring the reconsideration of countless pending cases, many with no record of the side-bar conferences. The Court stated, “The reversal, or even the reconsideration, of these appeals on Antommarchi grounds would create a substantial burden on the administration of justice and delay the disposition of countless pending cases.”
Therefore, the Court held that the Antommarchi rule applies only to jury selections occurring after October 27, 1992, the date People v. Antommarchi was decided. Because the side-bar questioning in Mitchell and Casiano involved matters of general bias, the Court found no violation of the defendants’ statutory or constitutional rights.