People v. Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170 (1992): Defining ‘Agreement or Understanding’ in Bribery Cases

People v. Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170 (1992)

In a bribery case, the statutory requirement of an “agreement or understanding” necessitates proof of at least a unilateral perception or belief by the bribe giver that the public servant’s actions will be influenced, which is distinct from mere intent or hope.

Summary

Tran, a hotel fire safety director, was convicted of bribery for two separate incidents involving a fire safety inspector and an undercover investigator. The Court of Appeals addressed whether “agreement or understanding” in Penal Law § 200.00 requires more than simple intent and whether there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to admit a co-conspirator’s hearsay statements. The Court held that “agreement or understanding” does require more than simple intent and that the prosecution failed to prove this element. It also found that the People did not present independent prima facie evidence of a conspiracy, making the hearsay evidence inadmissible. Thus, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed both bribery counts.

Facts

On February 2, 1989, a Department of Buildings inspector informed Tran, the fire safety director of the Carter Hotel, of a new violation. Tran placed $310 in the inspector’s shirt pocket, but the inspector refused the money and reported the incident.

On March 16, 1989, an undercover investigator posing as an inspector visited Tran at the Longacre Hotel. The investigator indicated violations and stated he would delay reporting them. Chu, a hotel employee, later gave the investigator $100, stating it was to “clear up…something here, about Local Law 16.” This conversation was recorded.

Procedural History

Tran was charged with two counts of bribery in the third degree. At trial, the court admitted the taped hearsay statements of Chu, over Tran’s objection. The trial court denied Tran’s motion to dismiss, equating “understanding” with an expectancy that the inspector would not file the violation, and instructed the jury accordingly. After the jury found Tran guilty on both counts, the trial court overruled Tran’s objection to the taped statement and denied the motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence and holding the hearsay statements admissible under the co-conspirator exception. Tran appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the phrase “agreement or understanding” in Penal Law § 200.00 requires proof of something more than simple intent to influence.

2. Whether the People presented independent prima facie evidence of a conspiracy, justifying the admission of a co-conspirator’s recorded hearsay evidence against Tran.

Holding

1. Yes, because the Legislature’s addition of the “agreement or understanding” requirement signaled a new element distinct from simple intent.

2. No, because the People failed to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy independent of the hearsay statements themselves.

Court’s Reasoning

Regarding the first issue, the Court emphasized that the Legislature’s replacement of “intent to influence” with “agreement or understanding” in Penal Law § 200.00 indicated a substantive change. The court stated that the trial court erred by equating “agreement or understanding” with “intent”. The Court held that the prosecution had to prove at least a unilateral “understanding” by Tran that the bribe would influence the public servant’s conduct, which they failed to do. A mere “hope” that the benefit bestowed would induce a forbidden favor is not sufficient.

The Court referenced People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 313 (1990), noting that the “gist of the crime is not the payment of money, but rather the ‘agreement or understanding’ under which a witness accepts or agrees to accept a benefit.”

Regarding the second issue, the Court reiterated that a co-conspirator’s declaration is admissible only upon a showing of a prima facie case of conspiracy, established without relying on the hearsay statements themselves. The Court found that the People’s evidence only showed that Tran and Chu were hotel employees, Tran urged the investigator to return, and Chu gave the investigator money. While Chu’s statement that the payment was to “clear up…something here, about Local Law 16” was an admissible verbal act, it did not, by itself, establish Tran’s connection to a conspiracy. The court distinguished this case from People v. Salko, 47 N.Y.2d 230 (1979), where the defendant made admissible statements directly linking himself to the conspiracy. Since no prima facie case of conspiracy was made, Chu’s hearsay statements should not have been admitted.