People v. Green, 78 N.Y.2d 1029 (1991): Admissibility of Identification Testimony After Improper Photo Identification

People v. Green, 78 N.Y.2d 1029 (1991)

When the prosecution fails to provide timely notice of a photographic identification, resulting in suppression of in-court identification, subsequent testimony about observing the defendant being chased near the crime scene is inadmissible if it relies on the tainted identification.

Summary

In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of identification testimony after the prosecution failed to provide timely notice of a photographic identification. A grocery store was robbed, and the clerk, Saleh, identified the defendant in a photo array. Due to the lack of timely notice, the in-court identification was suppressed. However, the trial court allowed Saleh to testify that the person he saw being chased by police near the store was the same person who committed the robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that this testimony was also inadmissible because it was tainted by the improper photo identification, and without this testimony, the case rested solely on the store owner’s testimony, which was insufficient, as shown by the defendant’s acquittal on a related charge where only the owner testified.

Facts

A Brooklyn grocery store was robbed on July 8, 1988. The owner and clerk, Nasser Saleh, provided a description of the robber to the police. Four days later, the owner saw the defendant on the street and alerted a nearby officer. Saleh, inside the store, saw police chasing the defendant just before his arrest. The day after the arrest, police showed Saleh a photograph of the defendant, and Saleh identified him as the robber.

Procedural History

The People failed to provide timely notice of the photographic identification, leading the trial court to suppress Saleh’s in-court identification. However, the court allowed Saleh to testify that the person he observed being chased on July 12 was the person who committed the July 8 robbery. The defendant appealed, arguing that this testimony was also inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether the testimony of a witness, identifying the defendant as the person he saw being chased near the crime scene, is admissible when the witness’s prior photographic identification of the defendant was suppressed due to the prosecution’s failure to provide timely notice.

Holding

No, because the testimony was tainted by the prior improper photo identification, and there was no independent basis to demonstrate the perception testimony was untainted.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing Saleh to testify that the person he saw being chased was the same person who committed the robbery was reversible error. The court emphasized that without the improper identification testimony, the case relied entirely on the store owner’s testimony. The court pointed to the defendant’s acquittal on a second related robbery charge, where only the owner testified, to highlight the weakness of the owner’s testimony alone. The court distinguished the present case from situations where a witness had communicated their perception of the defendant to the police prior to the tainted identification procedure. The Court cited People v. Myrick, 66 NY2d 903 and People v. Sanders, 66 NY2d 906. Here, there was no evidence that Saleh communicated to the police that the person he saw being arrested on July 12 was the same person he saw commit the robbery on July 8 *before* the improper photo identification. The court stated that “there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the perception testimony was untainted by the improper photo identification procedure.” Thus, the court reversed the order and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the need to exclude testimony influenced by inadmissible identification procedures. This case underscores the importance of proper notice and the exclusion of tainted evidence to ensure a fair trial.