People v. De Sair, 61 N.Y.2d 839 (1984)
A homeowner cannot claim justification for using deadly force to terminate a burglary under Penal Law § 35.20(3) when they invited the person onto their premises knowing the person intended to commit a crime.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the justifiable use of deadly physical force to terminate a burglary. The defendant, who shot and killed an acquaintance during an altercation in his home, could not invoke Penal Law § 35.20(3) because he invited the acquaintance into his home knowing the acquaintance intended to commit a crime. The court reasoned that the law is meant to protect victims of intrusion by individuals with criminal intent, not those who willingly participate in criminal activity. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.
Facts
The defendant was charged with second-degree murder for shooting and killing Rodney Marsh during a violent altercation in the defendant’s home. The defendant testified that he and Marsh had a heated argument and agreed to settle their dispute at the defendant’s home. At Marsh’s urging, the defendant retrieved his gun from his bedroom. Marsh entered the room and approached the defendant, leading to a struggle. After the struggle, the defendant demanded Marsh leave. Marsh refused and walked toward the defendant, stating, “You got your gun, use it, if you don’t, I will.” Marsh attempted to take the defendant’s gun, but the defendant pushed him off. Marsh approached again, and the defendant shot him.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense but refused to instruct on justifiable use of deadly force to terminate a burglary under Penal Law § 35.20(3). The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on § 35.20(3). The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a homeowner who invites another onto their premises, knowing the person intends to commit a crime, can invoke Penal Law § 35.20(3) to justify the use of deadly force to terminate what could technically be considered a burglary when the invited person refuses to leave.
Holding
No, because Penal Law § 35.20(3) is intended to protect individuals who are victims of an intrusion by someone with criminal intent, not someone who willingly participates in the criminal endeavor.
Court’s Reasoning
The court analyzed Penal Law § 35.20(3), which authorizes the use of deadly physical force to terminate a burglary. The court emphasized that the legislative history indicates the statute was intended to protect individuals who are victims of an intrusion by someone with criminal intent. The Court stated, “Section 35.20 (3) — as its legislative history makes clear — was intended to protect those individuals who suddenly find themselves the victim of an intrusion upon their premises by one bent on a criminal end.” However, the court found no indication that the law was meant to protect someone like the defendant, who invited another person into his home knowing they intended to commit a crime. The court reasoned that such an individual is just as responsible for the invasion of security and cannot claim the protection of § 35.20(3). The court essentially applied a principle of equity, stating that one cannot benefit from a law designed to protect victims when they themselves contributed to the situation requiring the use of force. The Court emphasized that the defendant was “no less responsible for any ensuing invasion of his or her own security than the would-be burglar, and therefore cannot claim the protections of section 35.20 (3).” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted in the memorandum opinion.