People v. Hynes, 75 N.Y.2d 844 (1990)

Extrinsic evidence is admissible to rebut an alibi witness’s claim of promptly reporting the alibi to police, as it directly relates to the truthfulness of the alibi, a material issue in the case, and is not merely collateral impeachment.

Summary

Hynes was convicted of gunpoint robbery after presenting an alibi defense. During cross-examination, his alibi witnesses claimed they told police about the alibi at the time of Hynes’s arrest. The prosecution then called the arresting officer to testify that the witnesses had not come forward at the time. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the officer’s rebuttal testimony was admissible because it related to a material issue—the truthfulness of the alibi—and was not merely an attempt to impeach the witnesses on a collateral matter. This is permissible under People v. Dawson, provided that the Dawson threshold requirements are satisfied.

Facts

1. Defendant Hynes was charged with participating in a gunpoint robbery.
2. Hynes claimed mistaken identity and presented an alibi defense at trial.
3. During the prosecutor’s cross-examination, two of Hynes’s alibi witnesses stated that they had told the police their stories when the police came to their home to arrest him.
4. Over defense objection, the prosecution called the arresting officer.
5. The officer testified that neither of the alibi witnesses had come forward at the time of Hynes’s arrest.

Procedural History

1. Hynes was convicted at trial.
2. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had not erred in permitting the use of extrinsic evidence to rebut the alibi witnesses’ claims.
3. Hynes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present extrinsic evidence (the arresting officer’s testimony) to rebut the alibi witnesses’ claims that they had promptly reported the alibi to the police, where such rebuttal testimony was used to undermine the alibi defense.

Holding

Yes, because the issue to which the extrinsic evidence related was material, i.e., relevant to the very issues the jury had to decide (the truthfulness of the alibi), and therefore the rule prohibiting impeachment on collateral matters does not apply, provided that the threshold requirements set forth in People v. Dawson have been satisfied.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule against using extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on collateral matters is meant to avoid confusion and unfair surprise on issues with minimal probative value. This rule does not apply when the evidence relates to a material issue, meaning it is relevant to the issues the jury must decide.

The court cited People v. Dawson, recognizing that an alibi witness’s failure to promptly come forward with their story can have probative value, bearing directly on the alibi’s truthfulness. Evidence of a witness’s prior silence is admissible to the extent that it could “aid the trier of fact in its effort to determine whether the [witness’s] testimony * * * is an accurate reflection of the truth.” The court emphasized that evidence of the witness’s prior silence is not admissible if offered solely on the issue of the witness’s general credibility but may be admitted to the extent that it bears on the truth of the alibi—an issue that is unquestionably material.

The court analogized the case to People v. Cade, where rebuttal evidence contradicting an alibi witness’s testimony was permitted. Here, the rebuttal evidence undermined the believability of the alibi. In both cases, the extrinsic evidence challenged the alibi’s validity, a material issue.

The court rejected the argument that the testimony was inadmissible because the prosecutor elicited the evidence to be impeached. The court stated that “regardless of who elicited the evidence, the subject of that testimony was directly pertinent to the truthfulness of defendant’s alibi and, consequently, was relevant to a ‘material’ issue.”