80 N.Y.2d 792 (1992)
A Family Court may adjudicate a youth a juvenile delinquent based on a finding that they committed a lesser included crime, even if that specific crime was not explicitly charged in the original petition.
Summary
This case addresses whether a Family Court can adjudicate a juvenile delinquent based on a lesser included offense when the petition only charged a greater offense. The Court of Appeals held that the Family Court does possess such authority. The court reasoned that the Family Court Act doesn’t preclude judges from considering lesser included offenses, and that a contrary holding would conflict with the provision allowing judges to accept admissions to lesser included crimes. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the juvenile delinquency adjudication based on assault in the third degree, a lesser included offense of the charged assault in the second degree.
Facts
Dwight M. was charged with assault in the second degree in a juvenile delinquency petition. The Family Court, however, found that he committed the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. Based on this finding, Dwight M. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Dwight M. appealed, arguing that the adjudication was improper because the petition only charged the greater offense.
Procedural History
The Family Court adjudicated Dwight M. a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. Dwight M. appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
Issue(s)
Whether the Family Court can base a juvenile delinquency adjudication on a finding that the juvenile committed a lesser included crime, even when that crime was not specifically charged in the petition.
Holding
Yes, because the Family Court Act does not preclude Family Court judges from considering lesser included offenses, and because a contrary holding would be inconsistent with the provision allowing judges to accept admissions to lesser included crimes.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the Family Court has the authority to adjudicate a youth a juvenile delinquent based on a finding that a lesser included crime, not specifically charged in the petition, has been committed. The court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Raymond O., 31 N.Y.2d 730 (1972), which recognized this authority. The court rejected the argument that section 345.1(2) of the Family Court Act required a different result, noting that this section has been part of the Family Court Act since its inception and has never been construed to preclude consideration of lesser included crimes. The court found that the appellant’s position would be difficult to reconcile with section 321.2 of the Family Court Act, which specifically empowers Family Court judges to accept admissions to lesser included crimes. The court reasoned that the Legislature could not have intended to deny Family Court judges the authority to base juvenile delinquency adjudications on lesser included offenses when it had specifically authorized them to accept admissions to such crimes. The court stated: “That section’s requirement that a juvenile delinquency petition be dismissed if its allegations have not been established has been part of the Family Court Act since it was first adopted in 1962 (L 1962, ch 686, § 751). It, however, has never before been construed as precluding Family Court Judges from considering whether a respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding has committed a lesser included crime (see, Matter of Raymond O., supra [decided 10 years after the enactment of former section 751 of the Family Court Act]), and we can discern no reason why it should be so construed today.”