People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.3d 462 (1999)
Cross-examination of a defendant-witness regarding an unrelated pending criminal charge, solely for the purpose of impeaching credibility, is impermissible because it unduly compromises the defendant’s right to testify in the case on trial and jeopardizes the right not to incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.
Summary
Henson, a State Trooper, was convicted of rape and related crimes. Prior to trial, the prosecution indicated they would cross-examine Henson about pending charges related to his attempts to obtain the victim’s DMV records by misrepresenting himself as an active trooper. The trial court ruled this cross-examination permissible, leading Henson not to testify. The Appellate Division reversed, citing that this ruling violated Henson’s right to testify and avoid self-incrimination on the pending charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that cross-examination on pending charges solely for impeachment is impermissible under People v. Betts, and the DMV incident did not sufficiently demonstrate a consciousness of guilt to warrant an exception.
Facts
The victim, a college professor, was stopped on the Northway by Henson, a uniformed State Trooper, for alleged erratic driving. During the stop, Henson ordered her into his patrol car and subjected her to a mock sobriety test involving blowing in his face. He then sexually assaulted her. After the assault, Henson allowed the victim to proceed to her destination. She reported the incident to authorities, leading to Henson’s arrest and subsequent suspension from the force.
Procedural History
Henson was indicted for rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, coercion, unlawful imprisonment, and official misconduct. While awaiting trial, he was also indicted for official misconduct and criminal impersonation for attempting to obtain the victim’s DMV records. Before the rape trial, the People sought to cross-examine Henson on the pending charges if he testified. The trial court ruled this cross-examination was permissible. Henson did not testify. He was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction due to the erroneous pretrial ruling. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
1. Whether it is permissible to cross-examine a defendant-witness regarding other pending, unrelated criminal charges solely for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s credibility.
2. Whether the defendant’s attempt to obtain the victim’s driving records constitutes evidence of consciousness of guilt, thereby making cross-examination on the pending charges permissible.
Holding
1. No, because allowing such cross-examination unduly compromises the defendant’s right to testify in the case on trial while simultaneously jeopardizing the corresponding right not to incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.
2. No, because the defendant’s conduct at the DMV did not reach the threshold for admissibility as consciousness of guilt, as there was no evidence that Henson intended to coerce the witness.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on People v. Betts, which established that cross-examination on pending criminal charges solely for impeachment is impermissible due to the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. The court emphasized that a defendant does not automatically waive this privilege by taking the stand. The court acknowledged the importance of the Sandoval hearing process to balance probative value against unfair prejudice but stressed that Betts provides a more categorical prohibition in cases involving pending charges.
Regarding the consciousness of guilt argument, the court stated that while certain post-crime conduct can indicate a guilty mind, the connection between the conduct and guilt must be reasonably inferable. The court found that Henson’s misrepresentations to the DMV clerk, while unlawful, did not directly relate to the rape charges and did not demonstrate an intent to coerce or harass the victim. Therefore, no valid inference of consciousness of guilt could be drawn.
The court quoted People v. Betts: “Allowing a defendant-witness’ credibility to be assailed through the use of cross-examination concerning an unrelated pending criminal charge unduly compromises the defendant’s right to testify with respect to the case on trial, while simultaneously jeopardizing the correspondingly important right not to incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.” The court also acknowledged that even innocent persons may act in ways that appear incriminating out of fear of wrongful conviction.
The Court also addressed the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome expert testimony, advising the trial court to determine on retrial whether the expert’s opinion has the requisite scientific foundation, and whether its potential value outweighs the possibility of undue prejudice to defendant or interference with the jury’s province to determine credibility.