New York Law Review

Matter of Wieder v. Board of Regents, 80 N.Y.2d 628 (1992): Expedited Professional Misconduct Proceedings

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Matter of Wieder v. Board of Regents, 80 N.Y.2d 628 (1992)

When a state agency makes a factual finding that a professional violated a state regulation, that finding can be used in an expedited proceeding by another agency to determine professional misconduct, provided the initial findings support a determination of misconduct under the Education Law.

Summary

Wieder, a psychiatrist, faced disciplinary action for failing to maintain proper records for Medicaid patients, a violation determined by the Department of Social Services (DSS). The Commissioner of Education then used this determination in an expedited hearing, suspending Wieder’s license. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the expedited procedure was proper because the DSS findings supported a finding of professional misconduct under Education Law § 6509, even if the DSS and Education Department regulations differed slightly. The court emphasized that the key is whether the prior agency’s findings support a finding of misconduct under the Education Law.

Facts

  • Petitioner, a licensed psychiatrist, was found by the DSS to have failed to maintain proper records for his Medicaid patients, violating DSS regulations.
  • DSS revoked petitioner’s Medicaid eligibility due to these violations.
  • The Commissioner of Education initiated an expedited hearing based on the DSS determination, eventually suspending petitioner’s license.
  • Petitioner argued that a full hearing was required under Education Law § 6509(9) to determine violations of the Department of Education regulations.

Procedural History

  • The Commissioner of Education found the petitioner guilty of professional misconduct and suspended his license.
  • The Appellate Division reversed, remitting the matter for a de novo hearing, stating the regulations were too disparate to support the RRC’s conclusion.
  • The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Commissioner’s determination.

Issue(s)

  1. Whether the Commissioner of Education could use an expedited procedure, based on the DSS’s findings, to suspend petitioner’s license for professional misconduct under Education Law § 6509(9).
  2. Whether the use of the expedited procedure was unfair to the petitioner, considering the Public Health Law § 230(10)(m)(iv) was amended after the DSS proceeding.

Holding

  1. Yes, because the DSS findings supported a determination of professional misconduct under Education Law § 6509, specifically the failure to maintain accurate patient records as required by 8 NYCRR 29.2(a)(3).
  2. No, because the procedure in an action is governed by the law at the time any procedural question arises, and the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the DSS proceeding.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Public Health Law § 230(10)(m)(iv) permits expedited proceedings when professional misconduct charges are based on an agency’s final determination of a violation of a State statute or regulation, and that determination constitutes professional misconduct under Education Law § 6509. The court cited Matter of Hee K. Choi v. State of New York, stating the test is not whether the regulations violated are the same, but whether the prior agency’s findings support a finding of professional misconduct under Education Law § 6509. Here, the DSS found the petitioner violated regulations that incorporated the Education Department’s record-keeping requirements. Furthermore, the court addressed the petitioner’s argument that the expedited procedure was unfair, stating that procedural rules are governed by the law at the time the procedural question arises. The court also noted that the principles of collateral estoppel apply, meaning that administrative agencies’ determinations are entitled to preclusive effect if there was an “identity of the issue[s]” and “a full and fair opportunity” to contest the decision. The court emphasized that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the DSS proceeding, noting that he was represented by counsel, could present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. The court highlighted that “petitioner knew that an adverse decision by DSS would result in a permanent suspension from the Medicaid program and reimbursement of over $70,000”.

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