People v. Gray, 76 N.Y.2d 333 (1990)
The justification defense under New York Penal Law § 35.05(2) requires an imminent, not speculative or remote, public or private injury, and the otherwise criminal conduct must be a necessary emergency measure reasonably calculated to avoid that harm, with no reasonable legal alternatives.
Summary
Defendants were arrested for trespassing during a protest against U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. They argued their actions were justified under Penal Law § 35.05(2), claiming their trespass was necessary to prevent greater harm resulting from the government’s actions. The New York Court of Appeals held that the justification defense did not apply because the harm they sought to prevent was not imminent and their actions were not a necessary emergency measure. The court emphasized the objective standard of the statute, requiring an actual, immediate threat, not a speculative or remote one. The protest was deemed not reasonably calculated to avert the perceived harm, nor was it the only available course of action.
Facts
On May 7, 1985, defendants participated in a demonstration against the U.S. embargo of Nicaragua at the Kenneth B. Keating Federal Building in Rochester. They entered Congressman Eckert’s office and, after being unable to speak with him directly, declared they would occupy the office until they could. They were asked to leave but refused and were subsequently arrested and charged with trespass. During the trial, defendants presented evidence regarding the situation in Nicaragua and their opposition to U.S. policy, but the court excluded expert testimony.
Procedural History
The Rochester City Court rejected the defendants’ justification defense and found them guilty of trespass. The County Court affirmed this decision. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave, arguing that the City Court misinterpreted Penal Law § 35.05(2) and improperly excluded expert testimony.
Issue(s)
Whether, under the objective standard of Penal Law § 35.05(2), the avoidance of harm resulting from the U.S. government’s actions in Nicaragua, as postulated by the defendants, constitutes an “imminent public or private injury” which could justify their conduct as a “necessary emergency measure” to avoid that injury.
Holding
No, because the harm resulting from governmental actions in Nicaragua, as described by defendants, lacks the immediacy required by the statute, and the defendants’ actions in committing a trespass in Congressman Eckert’s office cannot be viewed as an emergency measure reasonably calculated to avoid the harm or as a necessary choice over alternative, legal courses of action.
Court’s Reasoning
The court analyzed the language of Penal Law § 35.05(2), emphasizing that the conduct must be a “necessary emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur.” This requires not only that the conduct be warranted by the circumstances as an emergency response but also that it be reasonably calculated to have an actual effect in preventing the harm. The court stated: “[t]he requirement that the impending injury must be ‘imminent’ and ‘about to occur’ denotes an impending harm which constitutes a present, immediate threat — i.e, a danger that is actual and at hand, not one that is speculative, abstract or remote.” Because the harm resulting from the government’s actions in Nicaragua, as described by the defendants, lacked this immediacy, and because the trespass was not reasonably calculated to avoid the harm or a necessary choice over alternative legal actions, the justification defense did not apply. The court found support for this conclusion in the statute’s legislative history, common-law cases, and decisions from other jurisdictions involving similar protest demonstrations. The court contrasted the objective standard of §35.05(2) with the subjective “reasonable belief” standard in self-defense cases under Penal Law § 35.15. The court specifically referenced that the statute was envisioned to provide a defense of justification “in rare and highly unusual circumstances”.