Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 500 (1991)
State licensing of a substance abuse facility does not automatically preempt local zoning laws; preemption requires a clear legislative intent to occupy the entire field and prevent any local regulation.
Summary
The Village of Nyack sought to prevent Daytop Village, a state-licensed substance abuse treatment facility, from operating in a commercial zone where residential uses were prohibited. Daytop argued that the comprehensive state regulation of substance abuse facilities preempted local zoning laws. The New York Court of Appeals held that state licensing did not preempt local zoning, as the Mental Hygiene Law did not expressly withdraw local zoning authority, and there was no implied preemption. The Court emphasized the importance of harmonizing state and local interests, finding that dual regulatory oversight could coexist and that the state law contemplated cooperative efforts between state and local officials. Daytop was required to comply with Nyack’s zoning process.
Facts
Daytop Village, Inc., a non-profit, applied to the New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services (DSAS) for approval to operate a residential substance abuse treatment program in Nyack. The proposed site was in a commercial zone where residential uses were prohibited by the Nyack Zoning Code. Daytop did not seek a variance or certificate of occupancy from the Village. DSAS initially gave partial approval and then full approval after certain matters were settled.
Procedural History
The Village of Nyack sought a temporary injunction to prevent Daytop from operating without a variance and certificate of occupancy. The Supreme Court, Rockland County, granted the injunction. Daytop appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the Mental Hygiene Law preempted local zoning laws. The Village of Nyack then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the State’s regulation and licensing of substance abuse facilities under Article 19 of the Mental Hygiene Law preempts the authority of local municipalities to apply their zoning laws to such facilities.
Holding
No, because the Mental Hygiene Law does not expressly or impliedly preempt local zoning authority over substance abuse facilities; the state and local regulations can coexist and harmonize.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Mental Hygiene Law did not preempt local zoning laws. The Court acknowledged that local governments have broad authority to enact zoning laws for the welfare of their citizens, but they cannot adopt laws inconsistent with the Constitution or general state laws. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the state has demonstrated an intent to preempt an entire field. The Court stated, “[S]ueh laws, were they permitted to operate in a field preempted by State law, would tend to inhibit the operation of the State’s general law and thereby thwart the operation of the State’s overriding policy concerns”.
Unlike Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34, which expressly withdraws zoning authority for community residential facilities for the mentally disabled, Article 19 contains no similar provision for substance abuse facilities. The Court found no implied preemption, noting that the statute contemplates cooperative efforts between state and local officials. Governor Carey’s memorandum approving a 1980 recodification emphasized the importance of community-based programs. The Court emphasized that the test for preemption is not whether the local law prohibits conduct permitted by state law, but whether the state has evidenced a desire that its regulations preempt local regulations. Citing People v. Cook, the court reiterated that it looks to whether the State “has acted upon a subject, and whether ‘in so acting has evidenced a desire that its regulations should pre-empt the possibility of varying local regulations’”.
The Court also noted that the Village was not attempting to block all substance abuse facilities, as two such programs already existed in Nyack. The Village was simply requiring Daytop to comply with its zoning regulations, a legitimate exercise of its authority. The court highlighted that “the substance abuse programs set into motion by the language of the Mental Hygiene Law are largely cooperative in nature and look toward a joint effort by State and local officials to address the problems posed by substance abuse”. Because the interests of the State and the Village were not inherently contradictory and could be harmonized, Daytop was required to apply for a variance and a certificate of occupancy and otherwise comply with the Village’s zoning process.