Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553 (1991)
A general employee of one employer may be deemed the special employee of another, barring a common-law action against the special employer due to the exclusivity of workers’ compensation benefits, when the special employer exerts comprehensive and exclusive control over the employee’s work.
Summary
Thompson, an employee of Applied Transportation Service (ATS), was assigned to work exclusively at Grumman Aerospace Corp. for a year before being injured. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits from ATS, Thompson sued Grumman, alleging negligence. Grumman argued that Thompson was its special employee, making workers’ compensation his exclusive remedy. The New York Court of Appeals held that based on Grumman’s comprehensive control over Thompson’s work and the absence of ATS supervision, Thompson was indeed a special employee of Grumman as a matter of law, thus barring his negligence suit.
Facts
ATS hired Thompson, a sheet metal mechanic, to work at Grumman under a Purchase Order agreement. Grumman specified job requirements, interviewed candidates, and selected Thompson. Grumman fixed wages, while ATS provided paychecks and benefits, billing Grumman for labor costs. Thompson worked exclusively at Grumman’s facility, reporting daily to a Grumman supervisor who assigned, supervised, and directed his work. ATS had no supervisory personnel at the Grumman job site. Only Grumman could terminate Thompson’s assignment.
Procedural History
After Thompson was injured, he received workers’ compensation benefits from ATS. He then sued Grumman for negligence. Grumman asserted that Thompson was a special employee, making workers’ compensation his sole remedy. The Supreme Court denied Grumman’s motion for summary judgment, finding Thompson was solely an ATS employee. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Thompson was a special employee of Grumman as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether Thompson, a general employee of ATS, was a special employee of Grumman as a matter of law, thus precluding his negligence action against Grumman due to the exclusivity of workers’ compensation benefits.
Holding
Yes, because the uncontroverted record demonstrates that Grumman exerted comprehensive and exclusive control over every facet of Thompson’s work for a year prior to his accident, while ATS exercised no supervision or control over his work duties, thus establishing special employment as a matter of law.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule that a general employee of one employer can also be a special employee of another, despite the general employer’s responsibility for wages and benefits. The key factor is who controls and directs the manner, details, and ultimate result of the employee’s work. While special employment is usually a question of fact, it can be determined as a matter of law when the undisputed facts compel that conclusion. Here, Thompson worked exclusively at Grumman’s facility under the comprehensive and exclusive daily control and direction of Grumman supervisors, with no supervision from ATS. The court stated, “Many factors are weighed in deciding whether a special employment relationship exists, and generally no one is decisive… a significant and weighty feature has emerged that focuses on who controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work.” While the ATS-Grumman contract stated that Thompson was an employee of ATS, this provision alone was insufficient to establish that Thompson was not also a special employee of Grumman, especially since Thompson was not a party to the contract. Because Thompson received worker’s compensation benefits from ATS, this was deemed his exclusive remedy, barring the negligence action against Grumman. “Therefore, Thompson’s receipt of workers’ compensation benefits as an employee of ATS is his exclusive remedy and he is barred from bringing this negligence action against Grumman”.