78 N.Y.2d 516 (1991)
The continuous treatment doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions when the course of treatment, including wrongful acts or omissions, runs continuously and relates to the same original condition or complaint.
Summary
This case addresses the application of the continuous treatment doctrine to toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff, Massie, claimed the defendant, Crawford, committed malpractice by prescribing birth control pills despite her history of phlebitis. The defendant moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals held that the continuous treatment doctrine did not apply because the record did not establish a continuing patient/physician relationship related to the initial prescription. The Court emphasized that the policy behind the doctrine is to allow physicians to correct their own malpractice without interruption, a rationale inapplicable when continuous treatment is absent.
Facts
The plaintiff, Massie, alleged that the defendant, Crawford, committed medical malpractice by prescribing birth control pills, despite knowing her prior history of phlebitis while taking similar medication. The prescription was allegedly given nearly three years before the commencement of the lawsuit.
Procedural History
The defendant moved to dismiss the action as untimely under the statute of limitations. The plaintiff argued that the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute. The lower courts ruled against the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding no basis in the record to support the application of the continuous treatment doctrine.
Issue(s)
Whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action where the plaintiff alleges the defendant prescribed medication despite a known contraindication, and where the record does not establish a continuing physician-patient relationship related to that prescription.
Holding
No, because the record did not reflect that plaintiff contemplated, or had, a continuing patient/physician relationship with defendant concerning the original condition or complaint.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order dismissing the case, holding that the continuous treatment doctrine did not apply. The court emphasized that the doctrine tolls the 2 ½-year limitations period when the course of treatment, including the wrongful acts, runs continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint, citing CPLR 214-a; Nykorchuck v Henriques, 78 NY2d 255; and McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 408. The court stated, “The premise underlying the doctrine is that a plaintiff should not have to interrupt ongoing treatment to bring a lawsuit, because the doctor not only is in a position to identify and correct the malpractice, but also is best placed to do so.”
However, the court found that the plaintiff’s complaint and affidavits lacked support for her counsel’s assertions that the defendant supplied a six-month prescription, that she complained of leg pain, and that he advised her to continue the medication. Crucially, the court stated, “Indeed, the record does not reflect that plaintiff contemplated, or had, a continuing patient/physician relationship with defendant.” Therefore, the court did not reach the legal question of whether the conduct argued by counsel could constitute continuous treatment.