Cervoni v. Suffolk County Motordome, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 96 (1988)
General Obligations Law § 5-326, which voids agreements exempting owners/operators of recreational facilities from liability, does not apply to NASCAR licenses, and thus releases within those licenses can be enforceable.
Summary
Francis Cervoni, a mechanic, died from injuries sustained at Islip Speedway during a NASCAR-sanctioned race. He was struck by a car while in the pit area. His estate sued the driver, car owner, and speedway operator. The defendants asserted releases signed by Cervoni as affirmative defenses. The New York Court of Appeals held that General Obligations Law § 5-326 did not apply to the NASCAR license agreement signed by Cervoni, because NASCAR was not an owner/operator of a recreational facility. Thus, the releases were potentially enforceable, barring the plaintiff’s claims, and the dismissal of the complaint was upheld.
Facts
Francis Cervoni, a mechanic, signed a NASCAR membership application and paid a $55 license fee. He also applied for registration in NASCAR’s benefit plan, agreeing to abide by NASCAR rules and designating his mother as his beneficiary. The agreement included a release holding NASCAR and related parties harmless from liability, including negligence. On the race day at Islip Speedway, Cervoni signed another document releasing the same parties from liability. While working in the pit area, Cervoni was struck by a race car and died from his injuries.
Procedural History
The plaintiff commenced a negligence and wrongful death action against the driver, car owner, and Suffolk Motordome, Inc. The defendants asserted affirmative defenses based on the releases signed by Cervoni. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss these defenses and granted the defendants’ cross-motions to dismiss the claims. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that General Obligations Law § 5-326 was inapplicable and that Cervoni had assumed the risks. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but solely on the basis that the statute was inapplicable.
Issue(s)
Whether General Obligations Law § 5-326 renders the releases signed by Cervoni void as against public policy and unenforceable.
Holding
No, because there was no evidence demonstrating that NASCAR was an owner or operator of a place of amusement or recreation or similar establishment. The fee was for a mechanic’s license, not for the use of a facility.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals focused on whether General Obligations Law § 5-326 applied. The statute voids agreements exempting owners/operators of recreational facilities from liability for their negligence. The court found no evidence that NASCAR was an owner or operator of a recreational facility or that the license fee was for using such a facility. Instead, the fee was for a mechanic’s license. The court stated, “[T]here is no evidence in this record from which one could determine that NASCAR is an ‘owner or operator of any * * * place of amusement or recreation or similar establishment’ or that the fee paid in connection with that application was ‘a fee or other compensation for the use of [any] such facilit[y].’” Absent the applicability of § 5-326, the court declined to address the assumption of risk issue, finding that the release was potentially enforceable and barred the plaintiff’s claims, assuming no other grounds existed to invalidate it. The court reiterated the principle that, absent a contravening public policy, exculpatory agreements are generally enforced if they unequivocally express the parties’ intention to relieve a defendant of liability for negligence. The court distinguished this case from situations involving willful or grossly negligent acts or special relationships where public interest demands the agreement be rendered ineffectual.