People v. Womack, 73 N.Y.2d 877 (1989): Notes Taken by Juror During Supplemental Charge

People v. Womack, 73 N.Y.2d 877 (1989)

A juror taking notes during a supplemental charge and bringing those notes into deliberations is reversible error if defense counsel objects, because it is akin to providing the jury with unconsented written instructions.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court committed reversible error by allowing a juror to bring notes taken during a supplemental charge into the jury room over defense counsel’s objection. The Court of Appeals held that permitting the juror to bring notes from the supplemental charge was not reversible error, especially since the supplemental instruction explained relevant concepts and the court provided cautionary instructions. However, the dissent argued that allowing the notes was akin to giving the jury written instructions without consent, which is per se reversible error.

Facts

During the trial for robbery, the jury requested a supplemental charge on the elements of first and second-degree robbery. The judge provided the supplemental charge. One of the jurors took notes during the supplemental instruction. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court allowed the juror to bring these notes into the jury room during deliberations. The defendants were subsequently convicted.

Procedural History

The defendants were convicted at trial. The defense appealed, arguing that allowing the juror to bring notes into deliberation after the supplemental charge was reversible error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error. The dissent argued for reversal and a new trial.

Issue(s)

Whether it is per se reversible error for a trial court to permit jurors to bring notes taken by a juror during the court’s supplemental charge on the elements of a crime into the jury room, over the objection of defense counsel.

Holding

No, because the trial court’s supplemental instruction was not simply a recitation of the statutory elements, but an explanation of the relevant concepts, and the court provided cautionary instructions.

Court’s Reasoning

The majority reasoned that the trial court’s supplemental instruction was more than just a recitation of statutory elements; it explained the relevant concepts. Additionally, the trial court gave cautionary instructions, which presumably lessened any potential prejudice. The court distinguished the situation from providing written copies of statutory elements without consent, stating that the supplemental instruction involved explanation and context. The dissent argued that allowing juror notes was functionally equivalent to providing the jury with written instructions without consent, which prior case law considers per se reversible error. Quoting People v Owens, 69 NY2d 585, 591, the dissent emphasized the danger that “the written instructions…may be given undue emphasis…by their physical presence in the jury room, as the oral instructions fade from memory.” The dissent argued the cautionary instructions were insufficient to alleviate this prejudice.