People v. Friedman, 68 N.Y.2d 943 (1986)
A defendant claiming an exemption to a professional licensing requirement bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise a colorable claim that their conduct falls within the scope of the exemption.
Summary
Friedman, a dentist who had surrendered his New York license after a Medicaid fraud conviction, was charged with practicing dentistry without a license after performing dental services. He argued that he was exempt because he was licensed in other states and acted as a consultant. The Court of Appeals held that even if the exemption were an ordinary defense, Friedman failed to meet his initial burden of presenting evidence that he acted as a consultant. The court reasoned that simply performing dental examinations, which fall under the practice of dentistry, does not automatically raise a defense without evidence showing the examinations were for consultation purposes.
Facts
In 1984, Friedman pleaded guilty to grand larceny related to Medicaid fraud. As a result, he surrendered his New York dental license and sold his practice.
After serving his prison sentence, he returned to the clinic and performed dental services.
He was subsequently indicted for practicing a profession without a license (Education Law § 6512 [1]).
At trial, Friedman presented evidence that he was licensed in other states and claimed he acted as a consultant, which is permitted for dentists licensed elsewhere (Education Law § 6610 [5]).
Evidence showed he examined patients, prescribed treatment, and filled cavities.
Clinic records only indicated that patients received dental examinations.
Procedural History
The jury found Friedman guilty on two counts of practicing a profession without a license.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
Friedman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court’s jury charge regarding the consultant exemption was erroneous.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in its jury charge by allegedly placing the burden on the defendant to prove his status as a consulting dentist under the Education Law § 6610[5] exemption.
Whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the consulting dentist exemption.
Holding
No, because even if the burden was improperly placed, Friedman failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a colorable claim that he acted only as a consultant. Therefore, any error in the jury charge was harmless.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that even if the consultant exemption were an ordinary defense, placing the ultimate burden of disproving it on the People, Friedman still bore the initial burden of producing enough evidence to suggest he acted as a consultant.
“Even if, as the defendant contends, the exemption creates an ordinary defense which the People had the ultimate burden of disproving, the defendant had the initial burden of eliciting sufficient facts to raise a colorable claim that he acted only as a consultant.”
The court emphasized that the practice of dentistry includes examinations (Education Law § 6601), and the statute doesn’t provide a blanket exemption for dentists licensed in other states to perform examinations in New York. “The practice of dentistry includes performing examinations (Education Law § 6601), and the statute does not create a broad exemption from the licensing requirement that permits dentists licensed in an other State to perform examinations whenever they occur in the office of a physician licensed here.”
The exemption applies specifically to consultations. Friedman presented no evidence showing his examinations were for the limited purpose and special character of a consultation.
Therefore, the court concluded that Friedman’s actions constituted a violation of the law and, without additional evidence, could not simultaneously raise a valid defense. “The evidence in this case was merely that the defendant, licensed in another State, performed dental examinations here in the office of a dentist licensed in New York. That simply established a violation of the law and cannot, without more, simultaneously raise the defense.”
The Court found any error in the jury charge to be harmless because Friedman did not meet his initial burden of raising a colorable claim.