Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 77 N.Y.2d 1 (1990): No Public Right of Access to Professional Disciplinary Hearings

77 N.Y.2d 1 (1990)

There is no constitutional or common-law right of access for the public or press to professional disciplinary hearings conducted by the New York State Education Department.

Summary

Johnson Newspaper Corporation sought access to a disciplinary hearing for a dentist accused of misconduct, but the Office of Professional Discipline (OPD) denied the request based on a policy of closed hearings unless the professional requests otherwise. The newspaper then filed an Article 78 proceeding, arguing for presumptive openness. The New York Court of Appeals held that neither the First Amendment nor the state constitution grants a right of access to such hearings, and that the common law of New York also does not support a presumptive right of access, given the state’s policy of confidentiality in professional discipline matters. The court affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of the proceeding.

Facts

Johnson Newspaper Corporation, publisher of the Watertown Daily Times, requested access to a disciplinary hearing involving a dentist charged with professional misconduct. The Education Department’s Office of Professional Discipline (OPD) denied the request, citing a policy of conducting closed hearings unless the licensed professional requests an open one. The newspaper then initiated an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the OPD’s policy and to establish that professional disciplinary hearings should be presumptively open to the press and public.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court dismissed the Article 78 proceeding, holding that professional disciplinary hearings are not presumptively open and that there is no constitutional right of public access. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, with one justice dissenting. The Johnson Newspaper Corporation then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether there is a public right of access to professional disciplinary hearings under the Federal or State Constitution.

2. Whether there is a common-law right of access to such proceedings based on New York State public policy.

Holding

1. No, because there is no historical tradition of openness in professional disciplinary hearings and public access does not play a significant positive role in the process.

2. No, because New York State statutes and case law reflect a policy of keeping disciplinary proceedings involving licensed professionals confidential until a final determination is reached.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the two-pronged test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II is the correct standard for determining whether a First Amendment right of access exists. This test considers (1) whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public, and (2) whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. Since professional disciplinary hearings lack a tradition of openness, and the public does not play a significant role in them, there is no First Amendment right of access.

The Court also rejected the argument that the New York State Constitution provides a broader right of access, noting a lack of precedent or persuasive argument supporting such a claim.

Addressing the common-law claim, the Court distinguished its holding in Matter of Herald Co. v. Weisenberg, where it found unemployment compensation hearings should be presumptively open. Unlike unemployment hearings, Education Law § 6510(8) indicates a policy of confidentiality regarding disciplinary proceedings. The Court also noted that similar statutes for legal and medical professions exhibit the same policy.

The Court reasoned that confidentiality protects potential complainants and prevents harm to professionals’ reputations from unfounded accusations, acknowledging that professional reputation “once lost, is not easily restored.” The court stated that the policy serves the purpose of safeguarding information that a potential complainant may regard as private or confidential and thereby removes a possible disincentive to the filing of complaints of professional misconduct.