People v. Morgan, 76 N.Y.2d 493 (1990)

Grand Jury testimony given pursuant to a cooperation agreement is not sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest to be admissible at trial as a declaration against penal interest, especially where the declarant had a motive to minimize his role and implicate others.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals held that Grand Jury testimony of an accomplice, Flihan, given under a cooperation agreement, was inadmissible as a declaration against penal interest at the defendant Morgan’s trial. Flihan refused to testify at trial, and the prosecution sought to introduce his Grand Jury testimony. The Court distinguished this situation from a guilty plea allocution, where statements are inherently against penal interest. The Court reasoned that Flihan’s testimony lacked the necessary reliability because the cooperation agreement provided him with a motive to minimize his own role and potentially implicate others falsely to curry favor with the prosecution.

Facts

Defendant Morgan and others were indicted following an undercover drug operation. Flihan and Fata were arrested at the scene of the drug sale, while Morgan and Cefola were arrested at a nearby hotel room. Flihan entered into a cooperation agreement with the Task Force, agreeing to testify before the Grand Jury and at trial in exchange for the Deputy Attorney-General accepting Flihan’s guilty plea to a charge of second-degree conspiracy in full satisfaction of all “potential charges”. Flihan testified before the Grand Jury, admitting to selling cocaine and acting as a “broker” for the deal. At Morgan’s trial, Flihan refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege.

Procedural History

The trial court allowed portions of Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony to be read into evidence as a declaration against penal interest over the defendant’s objection. Morgan was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that admitting Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony was an abuse of discretion and violated the defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses. The People were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Grand Jury testimony given pursuant to a cooperation agreement can be admitted at trial as a declaration against penal interest when the declarant is unavailable to testify.
2. Whether, under the specific circumstances of this case, Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony satisfied the criteria for admissibility as a declaration against penal interest.

Holding

1. The Court did not explicitly rule that Grand Jury testimony can *never* be admitted as a declaration against penal interest.
2. No, because Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony, given under a cooperation agreement, lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, as he had a motive to minimize his role and implicate others falsely.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court distinguished the case from People v. Thomas, where a guilty plea allocution was deemed admissible. The Court emphasized that due process requires careful scrutiny of declarations from unavailable witnesses used to inculpate a defendant. The Court applied the four-step guide from Thomas, noting that while Flihan was unavailable, his testimony lacked the necessary adversity to his penal interest. The Court highlighted that Flihan’s cooperation agreement gave him a motive to minimize his role in the drug sale, potentially at the expense of others. The Court stated, “Key to our holding is that Flihan in the circumstances presented did not face immediate or certain conviction and sentence after testifying.” The Court found that Flihan’s testimony was not “wholly disserving” and did not carry the same safeguards of reliability as a plea allocution. The Court stated, “Under the circumstances, there was at least the possibility that Flihan was ‘using’ the system, rather than unburdening his conscience, the linchpin of this hearsay exception.” The Court concluded that the trial court’s jury instructions could not offset the erroneous admissibility ruling.