Matter of Campbell, 76 N.Y.2d 526 (1990)
A judge’s failure to promptly dispose of pending matters generally warrants administrative correction rather than judicial discipline unless the judge defies administrative directives or attempts to subvert the system.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reviewed a determination by the Commission on Judicial Conduct finding a Supreme Court Justice guilty of misconduct for failing to render prompt decisions in eight cases. While the court acknowledged serious administrative failings in the Justice’s handling of these cases, it found no persistent or deliberate neglect rising to the level of misconduct. The court emphasized the distinction between administrative failings and judicial misconduct, holding that delays generally warrant administrative correction unless the judge defies administrative directives or attempts to subvert the system. The court dismissed the charge against the Justice.
Facts
A Justice of the Supreme Court in Manhattan faced a complaint from the Commission on Judicial Conduct alleging undue and inexcusable delays in deciding motions and disposing of pending matters in nine cases. The delays ranged from seven months to over nine years. In four cases, parties commenced Article 78 proceedings to compel decisions. The Justice conceded the delays and stipulated to the facts. He explained the delays by pointing to the complexity of the cases and his heavy workload.
Procedural History
The Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a complaint against the Justice. A Referee sustained the charge with respect to eight of the nine cases. The Commission confirmed the Referee’s report and determined that the Justice should be censured. Two members of the Commission dissented, voting for admonishment. The Justice requested review by the New York Court of Appeals pursuant to the State Constitution.
Issue(s)
Whether the Justice’s delays in disposing of pending matters constitute judicial misconduct warranting disciplinary sanctions, or whether they are merely administrative failings subject to administrative correction.
Holding
No, because generally, a judge’s failure to promptly dispose of pending matters does not warrant judicial discipline but rather administrative correction, unless the judge has defied administrative directives or attempted to subvert the system.
Court’s Reasoning
The court recognized that the canons of judicial ethics require a judge to dispose promptly of the business of the court. However, the court distinguished between violations of canons concerning honesty and integrity, which generally warrant disciplinary measures, and failures to promptly dispose of pending matters. The court reasoned that the latter generally calls for administrative correction rather than judicial discipline. The court emphasized the need for a clear line between the role of the Commission and court administrators to avoid confusion and provide adequate notice to judges. The court held that the Commission’s severe sanctions should be reserved for situations where the judge has defied administrative directives or attempted to subvert the system (e.g., falsifying records). The court noted that new regulations provide for reporting of matters not resolved within fixed time limits and require judges to furnish reasons for delays, allowing court administrators to take appropriate action. The court found that the Justice’s delays occurred when these reporting rules were in their infancy and were not consistently applied. When administrators learned of the problems, they reduced the Justice’s case load, and he completed the overdue matters. The court concluded that these were isolated incidents and not the kind of derelictions commonly associated with misconduct warranting formal penalties. The court stated: “Litigants should not be expected to wait years for a decision because a Judge wants to produce a scholarly writing; neither should they be required to commence collateral proceedings to compel the Judge to render a decision.”