Segrue v. City of Schenectady, 76 N.Y.2d 759 (1990)

A public employee’s dismissal for misconduct involving a breach of public trust is not considered shockingly disproportionate, especially when the employee holds a position of significant unsupervised discretion.

Summary

This case concerns a purchasing agent, Segrue, who was dismissed from his position with the City of Schenectady for improperly altering a bid to favor a friend. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the original dismissal. The Court held that given Segrue’s position of trust and the severity of his misconduct (altering a bid), the penalty of dismissal was not so disproportionate as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness, even though other charges were dropped. The Court emphasized the significant discretionary power Segrue held in awarding public contracts.

Facts

Segrue was a purchasing agent for the City of Schenectady. He was accused of altering a bid for city property so that his friend would win the auction. The original bid of $55.21 was allegedly changed to $155.21. Prior to this case, Segrue’s dismissal was challenged in a previous Article 78 proceeding where the Appellate Division found substantial evidence to support the determination that Segrue had improperly altered the bid. Although other counts of misconduct were annulled, the matter was remitted for a new penalty determination.

Procedural History

1. The City of Schenectady initially dismissed Segrue from his position.
2. In a prior Article 78 proceeding, the Appellate Division upheld the finding of misconduct regarding the altered bid but annulled other counts and remitted the case for a new penalty determination (Matter of Segrue v City of Schenectady, 132 AD2d 270).
3. The Mayor reimposed the original penalty of dismissal.
4. Segrue initiated a second Article 78 proceeding challenging the dismissal.
5. The Appellate Division reversed the Mayor’s decision.
6. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the dismissal.

Issue(s)

Whether the Mayor improperly based the dismissal determination on prior unestablished allegations of misconduct in Segrue’s personnel file, and whether the penalty of dismissal was so disproportionate to the sustained offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.

Holding

1. No, because the record shows the Mayor’s decision was based on the sustained count of misconduct (altering the bid) and not primarily on the personnel file, even though the Mayor reviewed it.
2. No, because given Segrue’s position of unsupervised discretion in awarding public contracts and the breach of public trust involved in altering a bid, the penalty of dismissal was not shockingly disproportionate to the offense.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Mayor reviewed Segrue’s personnel file, the decision explicitly focused on the sustained count of misconduct. The Court noted that the Mayor afforded Segrue an opportunity to respond to his personnel file. The Court stated that the Mayor’s reference to the file served only to refute Segrue’s claim of political motivation. Regarding the appropriateness of the penalty, the Court applied the standard from Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 233, asking whether the penalty was “so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.” The Court emphasized Segrue’s significant discretionary power in awarding contracts worth over $1,000,000 annually. Given the “favoritism and breach of public trust involved,” the Court concluded that the dismissal was not shockingly disproportionate. The Court reinforced that judicial review of a discretionary penalty determination is limited. The Court cited Matter of Garayua v New York City Police Dept., 68 NY2d 970, 972 to further support the standard of review. The Court implied that a lesser penalty might be appropriate in circumstances involving lower-level employees or less severe breaches of trust.