In re David T., 75 N.Y.2d 927 (1990)
A juvenile delinquency petition must be supported by non-hearsay allegations establishing every element of each crime charged and the respondent’s commission thereof; failure to meet this requirement renders the petition jurisdictionally defective.
Summary
This case addresses the sufficiency of a juvenile delinquency petition under Family Court Act § 311.2(3). The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, set aside the adjudication, and dismissed the Family Court petition because the petition relied on hearsay allegations to establish that the juvenile, David T., was driving a stolen vehicle in a dangerous manner. The court held that the non-hearsay portion of the petition only established that the juvenile was seen walking away from a damaged car, which was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that every element of the offense be supported by non-hearsay allegations.
Facts
A juvenile delinquency petition was filed against David T., alleging criminal mischief and reckless endangerment. The petition stated that David T. intentionally damaged a motor vehicle and operated it erratically at excessive speed. A police officer’s deposition stated he observed David T. fleeing from a damaged vehicle with a broken steering column and other signs of theft and damage. The officer’s statement also alleged that David T. was driving the vehicle in a dangerous manner, but this was based on information and belief, not direct observation.
Procedural History
The Family Court sustained the charges against David T. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. David T. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the petition was jurisdictionally defective under Family Court Act § 311.2(3).
Issue(s)
Whether a juvenile delinquency petition is jurisdictionally defective when it relies on hearsay allegations to establish every element of the crimes charged and the respondent’s commission thereof, as required by Family Court Act § 311.2(3)?
Holding
No, because the non-hearsay portion of the officer’s deposition only establishes that he saw the appellant walk away from the car and observed that the car was damaged, and the allegation that the appellant was seen driving the vehicle in a dangerous manner is supported only by hearsay, which is inadequate under the statute.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on the principle established in People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, which held that a criminal information is jurisdictionally defective if it lacks non-hearsay allegations supporting every element of the offense charged. The court emphasized that Family Court Act § 311.2(3) requires that the non-hearsay allegations of the petition establish every element of each crime charged and the respondent’s commission thereof. Here, the non-hearsay portion of the officer’s deposition established only that he saw the appellant walk away from the car and observed that the car was damaged. Although the petition further alleges that the appellant was seen driving the vehicle in a dangerous manner, these allegations are supported only by hearsay, which is inadequate under the statute. The Court found the omission analogous to the defect in Alejandro. The Court reasoned that, like a criminal information, a Family Court petition serves as the sole instrument of prosecution or adjudication, necessitating strict compliance with the non-hearsay requirement. The court acknowledged that while the Family Court Act does not require evidentiary factual allegations like CPL 100.15(3), it still mandates that the petition be supported by facts of a non-hearsay character. Because this requirement is found in both CPL 100.15 (3) and Family Court Act § 311.2 (3), and both the criminal information and the Family Court petition serve the same purpose as the sole instrument of prosecution or adjudication, the failure to comply with the statutory requirement here must be deemed a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect.