People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (1989)

When determining if an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a predicate felony in New York, courts generally compare the statutory elements of the crimes, and may only consider the factual allegations in the foreign accusatory instrument when the foreign statute criminalizes multiple acts, some of which would be felonies and others misdemeanors in New York.

Summary

Muniz pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree burglary in New York. The prosecution sought to classify him as a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction. The New Jersey statute defined burglary as entering with intent to commit any “offense,” while New York required intent to commit a “crime” (felony or misdemeanor). The Court of Appeals held that the New Jersey conviction could not serve as a predicate felony because “offense” was broader than “crime,” including acts that would only be violations in New York. The court further clarified that the accusatory instrument from the New Jersey case could not be considered, as the statute was not divisible in the way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

Facts

Defendant, Muniz, was charged in Bronx County with attempted second-degree burglary and fourth-degree criminal mischief.
The People filed predicate felony statements, alleging Muniz was a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction.
The accusatory instrument from New Jersey alleged that Muniz committed third-degree burglary by breaking and entering premises with the intent to commit a theft.
Defense counsel argued that the New Jersey conviction should not qualify as a predicate felony because the New Jersey statute criminalized unlawful entries with the intent to commit any “offense,” whereas New York burglary provisions require intent to commit a “crime.”

Procedural History

The trial court rejected Muniz’s arguments and found that his prior New Jersey burglary conviction qualified as a predicate felony, sentencing him as a second felony offender.
The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the “intent to commit an offense” in the New Jersey statute was equivalent to the “intent to commit a crime” required by New York burglary provisions.
Muniz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the New Jersey crime of third-degree burglary, which requires intent to commit any “offense,” is the equivalent of a New York felony, which requires intent to commit a “crime,” for the purpose of determining predicate felony status under Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i)?
If not, whether the trial court could properly consider the factual allegations in the New Jersey accusatory instrument to elucidate the nature of Muniz’s prior crime?

Holding

No, because the New Jersey statute’s definition of “offense” is broader than New York’s definition of “crime,” encompassing acts that would not constitute felonies or misdemeanors in New York.
No, because the New Jersey statute defines a single crime, and is not divisible in such a way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) requires the foreign conviction to have an equivalent among New York’s felony-level crimes.
Generally, this determination is made by comparing the elements of the crimes as defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes, and the accusatory instrument underlying the foreign conviction is ordinarily not considered.
However, the accusatory instrument may be considered when the foreign statute criminalizes several different acts, some of which would constitute felonies and others misdemeanors if committed in New York.
New Jersey’s definition of “offense” includes acts that are the equivalent of petty offenses or violations in New York, while New York’s definition of “crime” encompasses only felonies and misdemeanors.
Therefore, it is possible to violate the New Jersey third-degree burglary provisions by acting with the intent to commit a petty offense, without necessarily acting with the level of intent required for a felonious burglary in New York.
The court distinguished this case from cases like People ex rel. Gold v. Jackson, where the foreign crime could be committed in several different, alternative ways, some of which would constitute felonies if committed in New York and others of which would constitute only misdemeanors. Here, the foreign crime was rendered a felony because of a particular aggravating circumstance (criminal intent), which included, but was broader in coverage than, the analogous aggravating element of the New York felony.
Quoting People v. Olah, the court stated that “ ‘the controversy did not turn upon [them]’ ” and that it is improper to look to the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument as a means of clarifying the nature of the defendant’s claimed predicate crime.