People v. Coleman, 74 N.Y.2d 381 (1989)
A defendant can be convicted of attempt even if the completed crime was factually impossible, provided the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.
Summary
Coleman was convicted of attempted promoting prostitution and grand larceny after soliciting an undercover officer he believed to be a 15-year-old runaway to become a prostitute and stealing her necklace. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that his mistaken belief about the officer’s age did not negate his culpability for attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree. The court reasoned that because he intended to commit the crime and performed acts towards its commission, the factual impossibility (the officer being 24, not 15) was not a defense under Penal Law § 110.10.
Facts
Coleman approached a 24-year-old undercover police officer, believing she was a 15-year-old runaway.
He encouraged her to engage in prostitution and offered to be her pimp.
Coleman asked the officer for her gold chain, and when she refused, he snatched it and later sold it for $30.
Procedural History
Coleman was convicted by a jury of attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether Coleman’s mistaken belief about the undercover officer’s age negates his culpability for attempted promoting prostitution in the second degree, where the completed crime was factually impossible due to the officer’s actual age.
Holding
No, because under Penal Law § 110.10, factual impossibility is not a defense to a charge of attempt when the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 110.10, which states that it is not a defense to a prosecution for attempt that the completed crime was factually impossible if the crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the person believed them to be.
The court distinguished this case from People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602 (1988), explaining that Campbell involved strict liability for an unintended result, while this case involves a mistake about an aggravating circumstance (the victim’s age) and not the core conduct (promoting prostitution).
The court emphasized that Coleman knowingly acted to promote prostitution, which is the core conduct prohibited by the statute. His mistaken belief about the victim’s age related to an aggravating element of the offense, not the underlying criminal conduct.
The court reasoned that because the defendant’s mistake related to an aggravating element of the offense, and not to the core conduct that is proscribed by the statute, such mistake does not affect the defendant’s ability to act with the mental culpability required to complete the underlying offense and thus is no obstacle to his conviction for an attempt of that offense.
The court stated, “The defendant did all that was necessary to complete the crime of promoting prostitution in the second degree and would have been guilty of the completed crime if the attendant circumstances had been as he believed them to be, that is, if the officer had been 15 instead of 24. The defendant’s mistake in that respect should not block his conviction for the attempt where it is the sole obstacle to his conviction for the completed crime.”