74 N.Y.2d 746 (1989)
A defendant has a right to counsel at a lineup when a removal order has been issued to secure the defendant’s attendance, and in the absence of a hearing to determine independent source, in-court identification testimony from witnesses exposed to an uncounseled lineup is inadmissible.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial because the defendant’s right to counsel was violated during pretrial lineups. The lineups occurred without counsel present despite a removal order securing the defendant’s attendance. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of the lineup evidence was not harmless error because the key issue at trial was identification, and the in-court identifications of the witnesses who attended the lineup were tainted. The court also addressed errors related to the testimony of an informant witness.
Facts
The defendant was convicted of robbery and other charges. The People’s case rested significantly on eyewitness identifications. Two witnesses identified the defendant at lineups conducted without the presence of counsel, despite a removal order in place to ensure the defendant’s attendance. Another witness was a police informant who testified in exchange for a reduced sentence on an unrelated charge.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding the case for a new trial.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the lineup testimony of the two witnesses should have been suppressed due to the absence of counsel during the lineups, given that a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance.
2. Whether the erroneous admission of the lineup evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Whether the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who attended the uncounseled lineups was admissible without a hearing to determine if the testimony had an independent source.
4. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the informant-witness’s testimony.
Holding
1. Yes, because a removal order had been issued to secure defendant’s attendance at the pretrial identification procedures, defendant had a right to the presence of counsel during the lineups.
2. No, because the only significant issue at defendant’s trial was identification, and the People’s strongest evidence came from the two eyewitnesses who had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.
3. No, because in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.
4. Yes, because the court should have instructed the jury to scrutinize the informant’s testimony carefully and determine whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony, and the court’s erroneous instruction created an imbalance.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that because a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance at the lineups, the defendant had a right to counsel under People v. Coleman, 43 NY2d 222. Since the defendant did not waive that right, the lineups conducted without counsel violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.
The court found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237, because identification was the only significant issue at trial. Two of the four witnesses connecting the defendant to the crime were subject to serious impeachment, and the other two eyewitnesses had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.
The court emphasized that the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who viewed the lineup was inadmissible without a hearing to determine whether the testimony had an independent source, citing United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 240-241; People v. Coates, 74 NY2d 244; and People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408. The court noted, “in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.” This underscored the importance of establishing that the in-court identification was based on the witness’s independent recollection of the crime and not influenced by the tainted lineup.
Regarding the informant-witness, the court found that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to carefully scrutinize the informant’s testimony for truthfulness, given the benefits he received. The court stated that “the informant’s testimony should be scrutinized carefully and a determination made as to whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony.” The court also noted the error in instructing the jury that the informant’s criminal past could be considered only insofar as it implicated his general credibility, thereby ruling out consideration of the more specific possibilities of bias and motive to falsify, citing People v. Bell, 38 NY2d 116, 123.